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CITIZENS NOT SUBJECTS: U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW AND THE DECENTRALIZATION OF FOREIGN 
POLICY 
Nick Robinson* 
INTRODUCTION 
[L]ocal assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations.  
Municipal institutions are to liberty are what primary schools are to 
science; they bring it within the people’s reach, they teach men how to 
use and how to enjoy it.  A nation may establish a system of free 
government, but without the spirit of municipal institutions it cannot 
have the spirit of liberty.1 
De Tocqueville found America’s “spirit of liberty” grounded in its 
citizens’ engagement with municipal political institutions.2  It was here 
that locally relevant and creative new policies were fostered, tyranny 
was resisted, and the responsibilities of self-governing were internalized 
by a democratic people.  For De Tocqueville this “spirit of liberty” 
required not only direct democracy at a local level, but also that 
municipalities possess relative power over their own affairs.3  It was this 
combination of local democracy with local independence that turned 
“good subjects” into “active citizens.”4 
Today, there are few municipalities in the United States that are 
 
* Yale Law School, J.D. 2006.  Currently Fox Fellow at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.  I 
would like to thank Judith Resnik and Reva Siegel for their comments on an earlier draft of this 
article.  An earlier version of this article was selected for presentation at the 2006 Yale Journal of 
International Law Young Scholars Conference.  I am grateful for feedback from participants at that 
conference, especially Paul Berman.  Finally, I would like to thank Bruce Ackerman for his 
comments arising out of discussions of this article. 
 1. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA VOLUME ONE 63 (Phillip Bradley 
ed., Francis Brown rev., Henry Reeve trans., 1954) (1835). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 69. 
 4. Id. at 69. 
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ruled through local assemblies of citizens.  Instead, representative forms 
of government are the norm.  However, citizens’ involvement with the 
politics of state and local governments (“localities”) still fosters and 
protects many of the liberty interests De Tocqueville identified in the 
1830s.  Citizens continue to find that it is generally easier to access the 
democratic process through state and local governments rather than the 
federal government.  This involvement is worthwhile for citizens 
because localities still possess independence over many policies that 
affect citizens’ lives.  Although certainly not every citizen is politically 
involved, localities create separate political communities in which 
citizens can participate.  Within these communities, issues of purely 
local relevance are debated and decided upon, but also issues that hold 
relevance beyond the localities’ and even the nation’s borders.  In this 
way, localities continue to be school houses of democratic empowerment 
while providing a check against the power of the federal government. 
It would seem that there are few areas of policy where the federal 
government has greater justification for claiming exclusive control than 
in foreign relations.  A misstep in foreign affairs by a state or local 
government can have adverse and potentially devastating effects on the 
entire country.  If a state or local government adopts a position that 
differs from official federal foreign policy, it fractures the country’s 
voice and negotiating power abroad.  Moreover, it seems prudent to 
centralize in the federal government the expertise and resources that 
have traditionally been required to conduct relations with other nations. 
And yet, state and local governments today have become deeply 
enmeshed in international affairs as globalization has decentralized 
foreign relations.  On the one hand, localities have become more 
autonomous international actors than they ever were or could have been 
before.  In pursuing interests with international implications, they tread 
in a sphere traditionally monopolized by the federal government.  On the 
other hand, the internationalization of many formerly domestic issues 
means that an increasing number of traditional state and local 
government actions now have foreign policy implications. 
The emergence of localities as actors in American foreign policy 
creates new possibilities for creating more participatory and democratic 
international relations.  It also merely reflects a world where increased 
interconnectivity across borders and the global regulation of markets and 
values has collapsed local and international concerns.  This article will 
argue that U.S. foreign relations law has failed to address this new 
reality.  The Supreme Court has largely clung either explicitly or 
implicitly to a jurisprudence that holds that the country should speak 
2
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with “one voice” in foreign relations.  Such a position is not only naïve, 
but it also weakens American democracy.  With globalization’s 
commingling of the local and the international, a strong judicial bias 
towards federalizing issues with a bearing on foreign relations will lead 
to a hollowing out of the decision-making power of localities.  States 
and municipalities will risk becoming largely units of administrative 
governance. 
To be clear, this article does not challenge the view that under the 
Constitution and its subsequent interpretation the federal branches have 
the power to trump state and local laws and actions that affect foreign 
relations.5  Article I, Section 8 and Article II of the Constitution provide 
the legislative and executive branches power to “conduct foreign 
relations through the enactment of federal statutes, treaties, and 
executive agreements.”6  Article VI establishes the supremacy of these 
federal enactments over state law.7  Article III grants federal judicial 
power to cases concerning these federal enactments and controversies 
involving foreigners.8  Article I, Section 10 prohibits a state from 
performing certain foreign affairs functions, including entering into a 
“treaty, alliance, or confederation.”9  The Supreme Court has interpreted 
these provisions together to give the federal political branches a power 
over international affairs that “cannot be subject to any curtailment or 
interference on the part of the several states.”10  The federal government 
clearly has the power to override state and local government policies for 
the sake of a unified federal foreign policy. 
Arguably, the judiciary should no longer accommodate the federal 
government’s unlimited plenary power in foreign relations.  The 
judiciary should instead balance federal foreign policy concerns against 
the interests of localities to ensure the federal government does not 
wrongly usurp local power under the guise of its foreign relations 
powers.  Court cases involving localities’ interests in foreign affairs 
often impact a diffuse and disparate set of issues.  As such, there is 
reason to believe localities may not effectively organize together to 
protect their interests in these cases.  Further, Madison and other 
founders probably more generally overestimated the ability of states to 
 
 5. Jack Goldsmith makes a similar caveat in his work on foreign relations law in Jack 
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1619-20 (1997). 
 6. Id. at 1619; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Id. art. II, §§ 2-3. 
 7. Id. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 8. Id. art. III, § 2. 
 9. Id. art. I, § 10. 
 10. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); See also Mo. v. Holland, 252 U.S. 
416, 432-35 (1920). 
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resist federal encroachment on their power.  This initial Constitutional 
miscalculation may need to be corrected by increased judicial 
intervention on the behalf of localities’ interests.11 
This article, however, leaves to others to determine whether the 
Constitution has been properly interpreted to give the federal 
government a largely unchecked hand in foreign relations.  This article 
makes a more modest claim.  It argues that courts should protect the 
space that is currently open to state and local government action that 
affects foreign relations–i.e., the space where neither the executive, 
Congress, nor the Constitution has barred state and local action that 
nonetheless affects foreign affairs. 
Instead of protecting this available space though, courts have 
adopted the opposite approach by repeatedly curtailing localities’ actions 
in foreign relations even without an explicit conflict with federal foreign 
policy or the Constitution.  Part I of this article details the four primary 
ways the Supreme Court has limited state and local action in such 
instances: (1) the reading of a dormant foreign affairs power into the 
Constitution; (2) heightened statutory and executive agreement 
preemption for matters affecting foreign policy; (3) heightened dormant 
commerce clause scrutiny in matters affecting foreign commerce; and 
(4) making certain claims nonjusticiable under the act of state or 
political question doctrines because they implicate foreign relations in a 
manner that courts have deemed should not be judged. 
These doctrines all find at least part of their justification in the idea 
that the nation should speak with “one voice” in foreign affairs.  This 
“one voice” doctrine is borrowed from principles of international law, 
which not only preference, but largely only recognize a univocal nation-
state–primarily the executive branch of the national government.  Under 
the “one voice” doctrine, the judiciary’s senses become heightened.  It 
examines disputes before it to see if the federal government’s one voice 
might be impaired in foreign relations, sometimes finding that it is even 
in situations where the federal government contends it is not.  State and 
local interests are all too often undervalued or left out of the reasoning 
process altogether. 
After surveying in Part I these judicially created limitations on 
localities’ actions that affect foreign relations, Part II then explores how 
international tribunals increasingly circumscribe state and local actions.  
Although none of these tribunals’ decisions are directly binding on 
 
 11. JENNA BEDNAR, THE MADISONIAN SCHEME TO CONTROL THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
21-33 (May 2002), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jbednar/WIP/madison.pdf. 
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localities, these bodies can penalize the United States as a whole for a 
locality’s action that brings the U.S. into noncompliance with an 
international treaty or agreement.  In turn, U.S. courts may find that 
these tribunals’ decisions, or simply a tribunal’s attention to a complaint, 
constitute enough interference with foreign relations to strike down the 
locality’s suspect policy.  Indeed, the mere threat of U.S. judicial action 
or scrutiny by an international tribunal may in and of itself be enough to 
cause a locality to back down from actions it otherwise finds in its 
interest. 
Part III defends a limited decentralization of foreign relations.  
Advocating decentralization in this context is not an argument to 
necessarily limit the federal government’s role or its trumping power in 
foreign relations, but rather to legitimize localities as actors in foreign 
relations as well. The varied voices of the different branches of the 
federal government and of U.S. non-governmental actors mean that the 
United States has never truly spoken with “one voice” in foreign 
relations.  Further, there are a number of reasons to believe that 
localities’ involvement in many aspects of foreign affairs has a positive 
impact.  To defend the decentralization of foreign relations, this article 
adapts three of the traditional defenses of federalism: the benefits of 
having diversity of state and local policies; state and local governments’ 
check on the power of the federal government; and localities’ ability to 
empower citizens.  It also addresses three often cited critiques of 
federalism that can be applied to localities’ involvement in foreign 
relations: the resource constraints of federal subunits; the danger of 
empowering or protecting local perpetrations of injustice; and 
federalism’s diffusion of accountability. 
Part III then argues that courts are ill-suited to determine when 
localities’ policies unduly damage U.S. foreign relations.  Instead, it is 
better to let the executive and legislative branches use their 
Constitutional prerogative to decide when to occupy or preempt certain 
activities within a field of foreign relations.  Therefore, the federal 
judiciary should only strike down a state or local law that affects foreign 
relations when it is in explicit conflict with the Constitution or has been 
validly and clearly preempted by the executive or legislative branches.  
Although courts should largely let these other branches regulate state 
and local governments’ actions in foreign relations, the federal judiciary 
is better suited to regulate both state courts’ involvement in foreign 
relations as well as their own.  Therefore, a limited invocation of the act 
of state and political question doctrines may at times be appropriate to 
curtail the judiciary’s enforcement of some federal and state laws.  
5
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Understanding the benefits of a decentralized foreign policy, however, 
the federal judiciary should use these doctrines with caution. 
Part IV applies the more jurisprudential and theoretical arguments 
discussed in Parts I, II, and III to a series of examples of localities’ 
actions that affect foreign relations.  Part IV differentiates these actions 
into five categories.  Such actions may: (1) foster exchange and 
cooperation with other countries; (2) protect or promote local markets 
and/or values in a manner that affects foreign relations; (3) judge other 
countries’ behavior; or (4) influence the federal government’s foreign 
policy.  Localities may also (5) adopt or borrow from foreign or 
international law.  It is chiefly actions that are deemed to protect or 
promote local markets and/or values (category two) that are placed under 
the greatest scrutiny under international law.  Meanwhile, it is both these 
protective actions (category two) and actions that judge or criticize other 
countries (category three) that raise the greatest level of suspicion under 
U.S. jurisprudence.  However, Part IV also notes that a restrictive 
interpretation of foreign relations law has implications for all five 
categories. 
The examples in these five categories provide greater context to 
understand some of the benefits of decentralizing foreign relations.  For 
example, state trade missions are designed to foster economic exchange.  
Partially decentralizing these missions to the state or local level may 
allow for greater economic rewards to the country as a whole than if 
such missions were only initiated by the federal government.  Localities’ 
actions that protect and promote local markets and values enable citizens 
to have fuller agency over their local communities as well as their own 
lives and provide a check against federal or international power.  Such 
actions may also encourage experimentation and debate over policies at 
a local level before similar national policies are implemented or a local 
standard gains acceptance across the country. 
Local mobilization around a foreign policy issue can also have an 
important precedent-setting effect on federal foreign policy.  For 
example, the South African anti-apartheid divestment movement 
engaged citizens in localities across the country.  Such local engagement 
helps foster human rights moments in which a section of the American 
public expresses support for a human rights-based foreign policy.  
Arguably, such human rights moments encourage foreign policymakers 
to promote similar human rights-based policies in relation to foreign 
policy issues the public is less mobilized around. 
There have been other proposals to strengthen participatory 
democracy outside preserving the democratic role of state or local 
6
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governments.  Part V briefly addresses one of these proposals.  James 
Fishkin and Bruce Ackerman have put forward a strong argument for 
having a deliberation day in local neighborhoods around the country 
before national elections in which citizens would debate and discuss 
amongst themselves the issues of the day.  Evidence indicates that such 
forums for deliberation do have an impact on voters’ views on foreign 
relations.  A proposal like deliberation day would likely get a larger 
section of the American public to actively engage in issues of foreign 
relations than simply ensuring localities retain independence in an 
internationally saturated governance environment.  However, 
strengthening localities’ independence addresses larger federalism 
concerns that ideas like deliberation day do not.  Instead, such ideas 
should be seen as complimentary to a movement towards decentralizing 
foreign relations. 
In conclusion, this article argues that more than a change in the 
mindset of the courts is necessary for localities to be effective foreign 
policy actors.  The federal government and localities themselves must 
also recognize the benefits of decentralization and amend their 
governance strategies accordingly.  Finally, ordinary citizens need to 
actively support a more balanced approach to foreign affairs in which 
localities are concurrent actors in foreign relations with the federal 
government. 
A general theme of this article is that the drafters of the 
Constitution did not envision the dominating and pervasive role foreign 
relations would play in the United States.  As such, the Constitution does 
not fully address the balance of power implications of giving the federal 
government, and specifically the executive, such a privileged role in 
conducting foreign affairs. In Democracy in America, De Tocqueville 
remarks on the isolation in which the United States was largely born and 
spent its early years “[s]eparated from the rest of the world by the ocean, 
and too weak as yet to aim at the dominion of the seas, it has no 
enemies, and its interests rarely come into contact with those of any 
other nation of the globe.”12  He notes the implications of this isolation 
on the power of the President within the U.S. constitutional framework: 
“[t]he President of the United States possesses almost royal prerogatives 
[in foreign relations], which he has no opportunity of exercising; and the 
privileges which he can at present use are very circumscribed.  The laws 
allow him to be strong, but circumstances keep him weak.”13 
 
12.  De Tocqueville, supra note 1, at 131. 
13.  Id. 
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In light of globalization’s increasing enmeshment of foreign and 
domestic relations, this article highlights a double fear.  It is not only 
that the federal government is given a new opportunity by globalization 
to commandeer control over many areas of governance from localities, 
but that the executive is strengthened in relation to the other branches.  
In this context, citizens’ involvement in foreign relations at a local level 
and the promotion of decentralizing foreign policy more generally 
should be seen as a method, however imperfect, to regain a safer balance 
of power within the government.  There may be other ways of creating 
this balance within the federal government such as by strengthening the 
respective power of Congress or the courts in foreign relations.  
Alternatively, more structural changes could be made such as 
transforming the U.S. representative to the U.N. into a nationally elected 
position.13  However, none of these alternatives so clearly engage 
citizens at a local level to become politically active in the creation of 
foreign policy. 
The argument in this article for local democratic participation is 
also, perhaps primarily, a humanist one.  With more possibility for 
participation, we become thicker citizens.  We have greater ability to 
engage in our communities and in turn more control over and 
understanding of our own lives as humans.  For Durkheim, government 
had its own consciousness.  Such a characterization highlighted that 
although government at its root might merely be a shared idea in a 
community of conscious humans, it could also have its own agency.  The 
state had its own logic that was removed, and even unknown, from those 
that “thought” government into existence.  He writes of a democratic 
state that “[t]he closer communication becomes between the government 
consciousness and the rest of society, and the more this consciousness 
expands and the more things it takes in, the more democratic the 
character of the society will be.”14 
For Durkheim, it is the democratic state’s reflection upon its 
citizens through its citizens that gave democracy a moral superiority.15  
 
 13.Although worthy and much needed inquiries, the overall relative merits of these different 
suggestions must remain beyond the purview of this article (as must proposals about how to make 
U.S. foreign policy more democratically accountable to the rest of the world). 
 14. EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 84 (Cornelia Brookfield 
trans., Greenwood Press 1983) (1957). 
 15. Id. at 91. 
This is what gives democracy a moral superiority.  Because it is a system based on 
reflection, it allows the citizen to accept the laws of the country with more intelligence 
and thus less passively.  Because there is a constant flow of communication between 
themselves and the State, the State is for individuals no longer like an exterior force that 
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When we debate where and how democratic governance will occur, we 
are battling over what choreography of thought will define our state and 
we as citizens.  Such stakes are not easily quantifiable.  If our aim in 
structuring governance, however, is not to reach definable utopias, but 
rather to balance as best we can the competing interests and tensions of 
being human and being governed, then we must take into account 
governance’s transcendent depths and not just its readily chartable 
currents. 
I. U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW’S MARGINALIZATION OF LOCALITIES 
When state and local government actions affect foreign relations, 
the Supreme Court’s senses become heightened, finding preemption and 
nonjusticiable claims where it would find none in a matter it deemed of 
merely domestic concern.  This heightened sensitivity is displayed in 
four primary ways: (1) the reading of a dormant foreign affairs power 
into the Constitution; (2) heightened legislative and executive 
preemption for matters affecting foreign policy; (3) heightened scrutiny 
for the dormant commerce clause in commerce affecting foreign 
relations; and (4) finding some claims related to foreign relations 
nonjusticiable under the act of state and political question doctrines.  
State and local government actions that affect foreign relations, but are 
not expressly preempted by Congress, the executive, or the Constitution, 
can be challenged and struck down under any one of these doctrines.  
The law in this area, however, remains unsettled and underdeveloped 
leaving many questions unanswered about the constraints it imposes on 
localities’ involvement in foreign affairs. 
1. Dormant Foreign Affairs Power 
In Zschernig v. Miller,16 the Supreme Court held that the structure 
of the Constitution implied a dormant foreign affairs power that could 
preempt certain state laws that affected foreign relations.17  Such a state 
law did not have to conflict with any explicit federal law or policy to be 
preempted.18  In fact, in Zschernig, the government filed an amicus 
 
imparts a wholly mechanical impetus on them.  Owing to constant exchanges between 
them and the State, its life becomes linked with theirs, just as their life does with that of 
the State. 
Id. 
 16. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 17. Id. at 440-41. 
 18. Id. at 441. 
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supporting the state’s position and denying it conflicted with federal 
policy.19 
The Oregon statute at issue in Zschernig v. Miller prohibited 
inheritance by non-resident aliens unless they could show the property 
they inherited would not be confiscated by their home country.20  
Additionally, these non-resident aliens had to show that American 
citizens enjoyed reciprocal rights of inheritance in the non-resident 
aliens’ home country.21  The Court found that this statute gave Oregon 
courts reason to probe and criticize the law of authoritarian and 
Communist regimes22 and in so doing intruded into a “domain of 
exclusively federal competence.”23  Justice Douglas distinguished the 
facts in Zschernig from the facts in Clark v. Allen (where the Court had 
upheld a similar California statute 20 years earlier)24 by claiming that the 
statute in Clark only had “some incidental or indirect effect on foreign 
relations”25 while the statute in Zschernig “affect[ed] international 
relations in a persistent and subtle way.”26  In particular, it enmeshed 
courts into probing the laws of foreign governments in a manner that 
might be considered provocative during the Cold War.27  This judgment 
of other countries by the courts could “adversely affect the power of the 
central government to deal with those problems,”28 thereby weakening 
the federal government’s position in foreign relations. 
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan argued that the Oregon statute by 
itself did not infringe on the federal foreign relations power and such a 
broad reading of preemption in foreign relations could not be supported 
by prior precedent.29  He observed that the majority had not shown that 
the Oregon statute had caused adverse effects on foreign policy.30  The 
mere possibility that the statute could have such adverse consequences 
should not be determinative, he argued, as many state court decisions of 
purely domestic concern had the possibility of raising criticism of 
foreign nations.31  Instead, Justice Harlan found that the Oregon statute 
 
 19. Id. at 434. 
 20. Id. at 430 n.1. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 440. 
 23. Id. at 442 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 24. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947). 
 25. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947)). 
 26. Id. at 440. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 441. 
 29. Id. at 443-62. (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 30. Id. at 461. 
 31. Id. 
10
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conflicted with U.S. treaty obligations with Germany and, therefore, 
should be found unconstitutional.32  Justice White dissented in Zschernig 
agreeing with Justice Harlan’s analysis that dormant foreign affairs 
preemption should not be applied to the Oregon statute, but disagreeing 
that the Oregon statute conflicted with any U.S. treaty obligations.33 
Zchernig left unclear the reach of dormant foreign affairs 
preemption.  Under a wide reading of Zschernig, any state action that 
had more than “incidental or indirect”34 effect on foreign countries or 
carried the “potential for disruption or embarrassment to”35 the federal 
government’s conduct of foreign relations could be struck down by the 
court.  Such a sweeping reading would bar any state laws that directly 
affected foreign relations and even those that did not if they were 
potentially disruptive or embarrassing to U.S. foreign relations.  Under a 
less encompassing view, states could interfere in portions of the field of 
foreign relations as long as their actions did not in fact adversely affect 
the power of the federal government to conduct foreign relations.  One 
could also read Zschernig to hold that dormant foreign affairs 
preemption could only be invoked if it involved “a state policy critical of 
foreign governments and involve[d] ‘sitting in judgment’” of these 
foreign governments.36  Finally, Zschernig could be read very narrowly 
confining it to cases with similar facts–in Zschernig the state court had 
been unusually critical and inflammatory of its judgment of a communist 
government during a time of heightened Cold War tensions.  This 
narrow interpretation of Zschernig is supported by the Court’s 
unwillingness to overrule Clark v. Allen, which was a case with 
substantively similar facts, but that took place in a different historical 
and political context twenty years earlier.37 
The Supreme Court has not based another decision on the dormant 
foreign affairs power.38  As will be discussed, however, dormant foreign 
affairs preemption has been invoked, although not relied upon, to expand 
 
 32. Id. at 443. 
 33. Id. at 462. 
 34. Id. at 434 (majority opinion) (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947)). 
 35. Id. at 435. 
 36. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 164 (2d ed. 
1996), cited in Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, Ins. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 396, 439 ( 2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 37. Brannon Denning & Michael Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and 
Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM AND MARY L. REV. 825, 857 (2004). 
 38. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg noted in her 
dissent that Zschernig has not been relied on since it was decided.  Id.  She did not suggest, 
however, that it should be overturned.  Id. 
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executive agreement preemption in Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi39 in 
2003.  The continued ambiguity surrounding the sweeping doctrine 
Zschernig suggests has created much uncertainty about the scope of 
judicial preemption of localities’ actions that affect foreign relations. 
2. Statutory and Executive Agreement Preemption 
A. Statutory Preemption 
In 2000, in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council the Supreme 
Court articulated a heightened legislative preemption doctrine for 
matters affecting foreign relations.40  The National Foreign Trade 
Council (which represents many of the largest foreign companies 
operating in the United States) challenged a Massachusetts selective 
purchasing law that generally barred Massachusetts state entities from 
buying goods or services from companies that did business with 
Burma.41  Massachusetts had enacted the statute in protest over the 
Burmese government’s notorious human rights abuses against its own 
people.42 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court found that the 
selective purchasing law was preempted by federal legislation that 
created a national sanctions regime towards Burma.43  The court reached 
this conclusion even though the national sanctions regime did not 
explicitly declare that states could not take punitive economic actions 
toward Burma on their own.44  According to the Court, however, the 
Massachusetts law undermined “the intended purpose and ‘natural 
effect’” of three provisions of the federal sanctions regime: (1) the 
legislation’s delegation of discretion to the President to control 
economic sanctions against Burma; (2) its limitation of sanctions only to 
United States persons and new investment; and (3) its directive to the 
President to develop a national multilateral strategy toward Burma.45 
The Court argued that the Massachusetts legislation, by acting 
outside this national sanctions regime, weakened the President’s 
capacity for effective diplomacy.46  The Court noted: 
 
 39. 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 40. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
 41. Id. at 367, 371. 
 42. See id. at 367. 
 43. Id. at 388. 
 44. Id. at 372. 
 45. Id. at 374. 
 46. Id. at 381. 
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[U]nyielding application [of the Massachusetts legislation] undermines 
the President’s intended statutory authority by making it impossible for 
him to restrain fully the coercive power of the national economy when 
he may choose to take the discretionary action open to him, whether he 
believes that the national interest requires sanctions to be lifted, or 
believes that the promise of lifting sanctions would move the Burmese 
regime in the democratic direction. Quite simply, if the Massachusetts 
law is enforceable the President has less to offer and less economic and 
diplomatic leverage as a consequence.47 
The Court made clear that there was heightened statutory 
preemption of state law in cases affecting foreign policy.  In particular, 
the Court stated that it would give added weight to the opinion of the 
executive branch in such cases48 and even consider the reactions of 
foreign powers to the state law at issue.49  In other words, there did not 
have to be as explicit a conflict in these cases with federal legislation for 
preemption. 
B. Executive Foreign Relations Power Preemption 
Three years after the Supreme Court found heightened statutory 
preemption in matters affecting foreign relations in Crosby, the Court 
was confronted with the preemptive status of executive agreements in 
Garamendi.  Writing for the majority, Justice Souter found that like 
legislation that ordered our relations with other countries executive 
agreements with other nations could preempt state law even when there 
was no direct conflict between the state law and executive agreement.50  
Until Garamendi the Court had only held that executive agreements 
preempted state law where conflict between them was explicit.51 
In Garamendi, a California law required insurers to disclose 
information about policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945 in an 
 
 47. Id. at 377. 
 48. The court stated that they had “consistently acknowledged that the ‘nuances’ of ‘the 
foreign policy of the United States . . . are much more the province of the Executive Branch and 
Congress than of this Court[.]” Id. at 385-86 (quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 
463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983)). 
 49. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 385. 
 50. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416. 
 51. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (finding international compact with 
Soviet Union undertaken by the President validated alleged confiscation of property); United States 
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (holding that executive agreement with Soviet Union that settled 
claims against nationalized insurance company barred further claims of this type); Dames & Moore 
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (finding executive orders that created Iran Claim Tribunal preempted 
petitioners claims against Iran in U.S. courts). 
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attempt to help Holocaust survivors more easily bring claims against 
these insurance companies.52  Justice Souter held that the California law 
was preempted by an executive agreement which encouraged Germany 
to create a voluntary compensation fund as the sole form of relief for 
Holocaust victims of Nazi-era insurance company crimes.53  The 
executive agreement, however, was silent on state information disclosure 
laws.54 
In showing a conflict with federal policy, the Court in Garamendi 
drew parallels between the California legislation and the Massachusetts 
legislation at issue in Crosby.55  Justice Souter noted that both pieces of 
legislation affected the ability of the President to negotiate with other 
countries and frustrated the mechanism of operation the President had 
chosen to conduct foreign policy on a particular issue.56  The leap from a 
broad reading of statutory preemption in foreign relations (where both 
the executive and legislature were acting in concert) to a similarly wide 
understanding of executive agreement preemption was novel, not to 
mention questionable based on past precedent.57 
In dicta the Court left open the possibility for dormant foreign 
affairs preemption in the case, hinting that the decision in Zschernig 
might not be as anomalous as some had concluded or hoped.58  Although 
the Court did not directly rely on the precedent of Zschernig, it used it as 
a mask of legitimacy for a precarious expansion of executive conflict 
preemption in foreign affairs.  Instead of relying on the dormant foreign 
affairs power, the Court explained it would use the more traditional logic 
of conflict preemption for its decision.59  As already noted though, this 
preemption analysis was anything but traditional.60  Coining a new term, 
the Court found an expansive “executive foreign relations power” which 
preempted state laws with executive agreements.61 
In determining a standard for when an executive agreement would 
preempt state law, Justice Souter borrowed from the muddied waters of 
Zschernig.  He categorized the majority’s opinion in Zschernig as 
preempting state actions from the entire field of foreign relations (i.e., 
 
 52. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 401, 410. 
 53. Id. at 420. 
 54. Id. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. at 423 (majority opinion). 
 56. Id. at 424. 
 57. Denning, supra note 37, at 831. 
 58. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Denning, supra note 37, at 856-57. 
 59. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 419. 
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preempting all state actions that had more than an “incidental” or 
“indirect” effect on foreign relations)62 and Justice Harlan’s concurrence 
as advocating preemption only in the case of conflict with express 
federal policy in foreign relations.63  Justice Souter then found that under 
either analysis presented in Zschernig the California legislation would be 
preempted.64  The majority in Garamendi did not decide which of these–
field or conflict preemption–would apply to the “executive foreign 
relations power.”65  In a footnote, Justice Souter, however, hinted they 
might both be applicable: 
The two positions can be seen as complementary.  If a State were 
simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious 
claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility, field 
preemption might be the appropriate doctrine . . . . Where, however, a 
State has acted within what Justice Harlan called its ‘traditional 
competence,’ . . . but in a way that affects foreign relations, it might 
make good sense to require a conflict, of a clarity or substantiality that 
would vary with the strength or the traditional importance of the state 
concern asserted.  Whether the strength of the federal foreign policy 
interest should itself be weighed is, of course, a further question.66 
Although the language is ambiguous, it would seem that when 
faced with a state act that affects foreign relations the first test is to 
determine if the act is “addressing a traditional state responsibility.”67  If 
it is not, then it is presumably void under the dormant foreign relations 
power.  This portion of the test, which importantly is in dicta, adopts a 
broad reading of Zschernig to be applied to state foreign relations 
actions where there is no traditional state responsibility.68 
The second part of the test is invoked if the suspect state action is in 
its traditional domain.  It weighs the interest of the state in the policy at 
issue against the clarity of the conflict.69  Justice Souter rests the 
decision on this second part of the test and Justice Harlan’s view in 
Zschernig that if any state policy conflicts with the federal government’s 
foreign policy it is preempted.70  To determine what severity of conflict 
is necessary, the Court should weigh the respective state and national 
 
 62. Id. at 418. 
 63. Id. at 419. 
 64. Id. at 420. 
 65. Id. at 419-20. 
 66. Id. at 420 n.11. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Denning, supra note 37, at 926-27. 
 69. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420 n.11. 
 70. Id. 
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interests involved.71  Justice Souter found that the California legislation 
at issue was sufficiently in conflict with an executive agreement to merit 
preemption and held on these grounds.72 
It is not clear from Garamendi whether the “executive foreign 
relations power” needs to be articulated through an executive agreement 
to preempt state actions.  Indeed, in Garamendi the Court uses 
statements made by sub-cabinet level officials to support the position 
that the California law was in conflict with the executive agreement.73  
Statements like these could potentially be used in the future to preempt 
state legislation without even the need for an executive agreement under 
a broad theory of the executive foreign relations power. 
3. Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause 
The use of heightened preemption is not just confined to statutory 
or executive agreement preemption, but also extends to the dormant 
commerce clause.74  The Court has moved away from a far-reaching 
interpretation of the dormant foreign commerce clause to one that much 
more closely resembles ordinary dormant commerce clause preemption.  
Such a move is welcome, but may come under threat if the logic of 
Garamendi is applied to future dormant foreign commerce clause cases. 
In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, the Court indicated 
that the dormant commerce clause has greater reach when applied to 
international commerce.75  It held that “[shipping containers] that are 
owned, based, and registered abroad and that are used exclusively in 
international commerce [could not be] subjected to apportioned ad 
valorem property taxation by [California].”76  According to the Court, 
when a state attempts to tax containers in foreign commerce, as opposed 
to merely interstate commerce, there is an increased risk of multiple 
taxation (since it is difficult for states to coordinate their taxation 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 420. 
 73. Id. at 411; id. at 441-42 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 74. The Supreme Court has long held that state laws that are “inimical” to interstate 
commerce will be struck down even if Congress has not acted.  See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. 
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945); S.C. Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 
U.S. 177, 185 (1938); City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978). 
 75. 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (“Although the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, grants Congress 
power to regulate commerce ‘with foreign Nations’ and ‘among the several States’ in parallel 
phrases, there is evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be 
the greater.”). 
 76. Id. at 434-45. 
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schemes with foreign countries).77  Further, the California tax 
undermined the ability of the federal government to “[speak] with one 
voice” when regulating foreign commerce.78 
In 1986, the Court limited the impact of Japan Line in Wardair 
Canada, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue.79  In Wardair the Court upheld a 
Florida aviation fuel tax despite the applicant’s and the United States’ 
claim as amicus curiae that the tax “threaten[ed] the ability of the 
Federal Government to ‘speak with one voice.’”80  The Court clarified 
that although they found that the tax in Japan Lines prevented the 
Federal Government from speaking with one voice in foreign relations 
they did not thereby suggest that “the Foreign Commerce Clause insists 
that the Federal Government speak with any particular voice.”81 
In 1993, in Itel Containers Intern Corp. v. Huddleston the Court 
upheld a Tennessee tax on containers where that tax avoided imposing 
multiple taxation82 and the U.S. government had submitted an amicus 
brief supporting the state tax.83  Japan Line was further limited in 
Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board in 1994.84  In Barclays, Justice 
Ginsburg, writing for the Court, upheld California’s system of taxing a 
portion of foreign corporations’ worldwide operations.  The Court first 
found that California’s tax system did not violate the interstate 
commerce clause as traditionally applied domestically.85  The Court then 
found that the risk of double taxation was acceptable as long as it was 
not an “inevitable result” of the California taxation scheme and that an 
alternative taxing scheme “could not eliminate the risk of double 
taxation.”86  Importantly, the Court also required that Congress indicate 
that it intended to bar the taxation system in order for there to be a 
conflict with the country’s “one voice” in foreign relations.87  Although 
major trading partners had objected to the tax, the Court concluded that 
by not specifically prohibiting California’s taxation system Congress had 
“passively indicate[d] that certain state practices do not ‘impair federal 
uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential.’”88  Justice 
 
 77. Id. at 446. 
 78. Id. at 452. 
 79. 477 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 80. Id. at 9. 
 81. Id. at 13. 
 82. 507 U.S. 60, 74 (1993). 
 83. Id. at 75. 
 84. 512 U.S. 298 (1994). 
 85. Id. at 314. 
 86. Id. at 318-19. 
 87. Id. at 324. 
 88. Id. at 323 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)). 
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Ginsburg also rejected the petitioner’s claim that executive statements 
demonstrated that the California taxing system interfered with the 
federal government’s ability to speak with a uniform voice.89  She found 
that it is Congress, and not the executive, that is given the power to 
regulate commerce under the Commerce Clause.90 
Wardair, Itel, and Barclays limited the heightened nature of the 
dormant foreign commerce clause that was upheld in Japan Line.  
Garamendi, however, which was decided after Barclays, raises new 
questions about this jurisprudence.  If there are strong executive 
statements or orders surrounding a commerce clause issue, the Court 
might find preemption under the executive foreign relations power or 
give such executive branch actions new weight under the dormant 
foreign commerce clause. 
4. Act of State and Political Question Doctrines 
The act of state and political question doctrines both limit 
justiciability.  Courts often use these doctrines to refuse to hear issues 
that could potentially affect foreign relations.  In relinquishing their role 
as arbitrators of these disputes, state law or state common law is often 
simply not enforced.  As such, courts can use these doctrines to limit the 
impact of localities’ actions that affect foreign affairs. 
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Supreme Court 
assumed the competence to trump state law to create judicial rules of 
decision of particular importance to foreign relations, such as the act of 
state doctrine.91  The act of state doctrine is not found in the 
Constitution, but is instead a judicially created doctrine that “arises out 
of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system 
of separation of powers.”92  Its classic formulation is that “the courts of 
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of 
another, done within its own territory.”93  Like Garamendi, Crosby, and 
Zschernig, the general finding of Sabbatino is that normal lawmaking 
gives way when a dispute has international implications.94 
 
 89. Id. at 328-29. 
 90. Id. at 329. 
 91. 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (“[W]e are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned 
with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National 
Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community must be 
treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.”). 
 92. Id. at 423. 
 93. Id. at 416 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)). 
 94. Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and American Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
237, 240 (2000). 
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The act of state doctrine does not apply to every situation in which 
a state’s actions are called into question.  The Court in Sabbatino laid 
out two considerations to help determine when the act of state doctrine 
should apply.  First, “the less important the implications of an issue are 
for our foreign relations,” the more likely the court will not invoke the 
act of state doctrine.95  Second, “the greater the degree of codification or 
consensus concerning a particular area of international law” that the 
court is being asked to apply to a state’s actions, the more likely the 
court will not invoke the doctrine.96  Later cases have even further 
constrained the doctrine.97  A court will take into consideration the 
opinions of the executive branch in a potential act of state doctrine case, 
but the courts have treated the executive branch’s observations as only 
one relevant factor of consideration and not binding.98 
The political question doctrine is invoked by courts when they feel 
absolute deference to the other branches of government is appropriate.99  
 
 95. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. 
 96. Id.  The Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982), passed by 
Congress effectively overrode the specific outcome of Sabbatino by making it clear that an 
uncompensated government taking is a clear violation of international law in which the Act of State 
doctrine would not be applicable.  See West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 829 
(1987). 
 97. E.g., W.S. Kirpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (finding that 
the doctrine does not apply when a court only incidentally makes a factual judgment about an act of 
state that may embarrass a foreign government); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of 
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (finding the act of state doctrine does not protect foreign sovereigns 
when they are acting in purely commercial areas); Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 
1355 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the burden of proof that the acts at issue were acts of state rests on 
the one claiming the doctrine applies); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat’l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d 
Cir. 1965) (finding act of state doctrine does not apply to actions sovereign takes to confiscate 
property in the United States). 
 98. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 790 (1972) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  In First National City Bank, three Supreme Court justices in the five justice majority 
upheld the use of the Bernstein exception which gives the executive branch authority to override the 
act of state doctrine.  Id. at 768 (plurality opinion).  Under this exception, if the executive makes 
clear that it does not want the courts to be barred from hearing a case under the act of state doctrine 
a court would then proceed with the case without applying the act of state doctrine.  Id.  However, 
one justice did not feel that the Bernstein exception needed to be applied in the case.  Id. at 773 
(Douglas, J., concurring).  Further, one justice in the plurality and four justices in the minority 
rejected the Bernstein exception.  Id. (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 792 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
Since then, lower courts have generally treated executive suggestions as relevant, but not 
dispositive. 
 99. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).  The Court found that on the surface of any case 
involving a political question there is at least one of the following formulations: 
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
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The judiciary has found such deference may be necessary in cases that 
involve the foreign policy decisions of the executive and legislative 
branches of the United States.  Many times, this abdication of decision-
making power to the other branches of the federal government affects 
localities’ interests.  For example, in Made in the USA Foundation v. 
United States, the Eleventh Circuit found that the question of whether 
the Senate must ratify the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) by the two-thirds of the Senate required for treaty ratification 
was a nonjusticiable political question.100  As will be discussed later in 
this article, NAFTA has far ranging implications for localities’ interests, 
but the judiciary refused to even consider whether the United States had 
properly bound itself to the agreement. 
In 2006, at least three negligence suits against private contractors 
whose employees were killed in Iraq were removed from state court and 
dismissed from federal district court on the basis of the political question 
doctrine.101  The courts who heard these cases held that even though it 
was private contractors whose actions were in question a decision in 
these cases would necessarily implicate the actions and judgments of the 
U.S. military.102  In this way, the political question doctrine can be 
applied to not only the actions of the federal government, but also to 
those whose actions are intertwined in the federal government’s policies. 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW’S IMPACT ON LOCALITIES 
International law has increasingly scrutinized state and local 
government policies.  These challenges have come primarily in the areas 
of trade and human rights.  The arbitrators of international agreements 
do not have the power to directly strike down offending state or local 
statutes or policies, but can penalize or reprimand the United States as a 
whole, thereby imposing collective national punishment for state or local 
action.103 
 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements 
by various departments on one question. 
Id. at 217. 
 100. 242 F.3d 1300 (2001). 
 101. Fisher v. Halliburton, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 637, 644 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Smith v. 
Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61980, at *26 (S.D. Tex Aug. 30, 2006); 
Whitaker v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1282 (M.D. Ga. 2006). 
 102. Fisher, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 644; Smith, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61980, at *20; Whitaker, 
444 F. Supp. 2d at 1282. 
 103. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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Investors have used Chapter Eleven of NAFTA to challenge state 
and local laws and judicial decisions.104  In October 2002, in Mondev 
International Ltd. v. United States a Chapter Eleven Arbitral Tribunal 
rejected a NAFTA challenge by a Canadian real estate developer to a 
decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.105  The Chapter 
Eleven Tribunal held that the Massachusetts court’s decision to deny the 
developer relief did not constitute a breach of Article 1105 of NAFTA, 
which specified certain minimum standards of treatment for investors in 
accordance with international law.106  In particular, it found that the 
Massachusetts court’s decision that the Massachusetts legislature had 
legally extended limited immunity from liability to the Boston 
Redevelopment Agency did not breach Article 1105.107  The tribunal 
indicated though that some types of immunity from liability, even if 
granted by the legislature, would be barred by Article 1105.108 
In June 2003, in Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, a Chapter 
Eleven Arbitration Tribunal examined a multi-hundred million-dollar 
Mississippi jury award against a Canadian company.109  The company 
had argued that the award was exorbitant and was the outcome of 
protectionist appeals to the jury.110  The NAFTA Tribunal rejected the 
complaint on jurisdictional grounds, finding that all avenues of appeal 
had not been exhausted in U.S. courts.111  Further, through corporate 
restructuring the Canadian company who brought the case had 
effectively become a U.S. company, thereby barring it from challenging 
its own government under NAFTA.112  Despite dismissing the complaint 
on these jurisdictional grounds, the Tribunal did find that the actions of 
the Mississippi courts had violated Article 1105 of NAFTA and that the 
company would have been entitled to recover if not for the jurisdictional 
 
 104. NAFTA’s dispute settlement mechanisms are found in Chapter Eleven, Nineteen, and 
Twenty.  See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 
605, 639-99 [hereinafter NAFTA].  This article primarily deals with cases that have arisen under 
Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, which guarantees certain standards of treatment and non-discrimination 
for investors from NAFTA’s other member-parties.  Id. ch. 11, 32 I.L.M. 639-49. 
 105. Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. 
Trib. Oct. 11, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/14442.pdf. 
 106. Id. at 55. 
 107. Id. at 58. 
 108. Id. at 54-55. 
 109. ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 26, 2003), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf. 
 110. Id. at 2-3. 
 111. Id. at 61. 
 112. Id. at 67. 
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faults in its case.113 
Taken together these two cases might represent a foundational 
moment in which NAFTA tribunals ensured future jurisdiction for 
similar claims while denying relief for these two specific claims.114  
These decisions laid out flexible standards for determining similar cases 
that could easily be interpreted to give NAFTA tribunals broad 
jurisdiction in the future.  For example, in Mondev to determine whether 
there had been a denial of justice under Article 1105 the tribunal created 
the following nebulous test: 
In the end the question is whether, at an international level and having 
regard to generally accepted standards of the administration of justice, 
a tribunal can conclude in the light of all the available facts that the 
impugned decision was clearly improper and discreditable, with the 
result that the investment has been subjected to unfair and inequitable 
treatment.115 
A Chapter Eleven tribunal has already found that actions by local 
government officials in Mexico violated NAFTA.  In Metalclad v. 
United Mexican States, Metalclad, a U.S. waste disposal company, 
claimed that it had been invited to build a landfill site in Guadalcazar 
and was assured by government officials that a needed municipal permit 
was a mere formality.116  Metalclad began construction of the site, but 
“local [community] opposition resulted in the [m]unicipality denying a 
construction permit [in] 1995 and [receiving] an injunction in Mexican 
courts to prevent operation of the site.”117  In August of 2000, the 
NAFTA tribunal found that Articles 1105 and 1110 of NAFTA had been 
violated.118  In particular, the Mexican government had breached 
NAFTA transparency requirements.119  Further, the tribunal found that 
denial of a construction permit to which Metalclad was otherwise legally 
entitled amounted to an expropriation of Metalclad’s property under 
NAFTA.120  The tribunal awarded Metalclad nearly $16.7 million in 
 
 113. Id. at 70. 
 114. JOHN D. ESCHEVERRIA, GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW & POLICY INST., LOWEN, MONDEY 
AND REVIEW OF U.S. JUDICIAL RULINGS BY INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PANELS (2003), 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/research_archive/trade/LoewenMondev.pdf. 
 115. Id. at 7. 
 116. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, at 14 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. 
Trib. Aug. 30, 2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mm-award-e.pdf. 
 117. Simon Baughen, Expropriation and Environmental Regulation: The Lessons of NAFTA 
Chapter Eleven, 18 J. Envtl. L. 207, 220 (2006). 
 118. Id. at 221. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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damages.121 
NAFTA is not the only international trade agreement which affects 
state and local laws and regulations.  GATT, the WTO trade dispute 
panels, and the WTO’s appellate body have found the United States to 
be in breach of its trade commitments because of state policies. 
In 1992, a GATT panel found that federal and state differential 
treatment for in-state and domestic alcohol brewers in regards to taxes, 
tax credits, and regulations violated GATT.122  The decision has 
potentially larger implications because the GATT panel found that the 
U.S. government was responsible for state law in violation of GATT.  
The panel examined U.S. law and found that since GATT was part of 
federal law the federal government could override inconsistent state law 
under the commerce clause.123  Further, after reviewing U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent the panel concluded that “the Twenty-first Amendment 
grants broad police powers to the states to regulate the distribution and 
sale of alcoholic beverages but does not grant the states powers to 
protect in-state producers of alcoholic beverages against imports of 
competing like products.”124  Finding no barrier to the federal 
government enforcing its findings against the states, the panel dismissed 
any suggestion to the contrary as merely pretext for noncompliance.125 
The United States has a duty under GATT to take reasonable 
measures to ensure observance of the provisions of the agreement by 
regional and local governments.126  No GATT panel, however, has yet to 
directly address a situation in which it found the state party did not have 
the power to change the offending law of a governmental subunit.127  If 
there was such a finding it is unclear whether this would affect a 
country’s obligations for compliance under GATT. 
In November 2004, a WTO panel found that certain U.S. 
restrictions on overseas gambling violated the General Agreement on 
Trades in Services (GATS).  Antigua, who brought the complaint, only 
 
 121. Metalclad, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, at 35. 
 122. Report of the Panel, United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages 
(June 19, 1992), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206 (1993). 
 123. Id. ¶ 5.45. 
 124. Id. ¶ 5.46. 
 125. Id. ¶ 6. 
 126. General Agreement Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.  
“Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure 
observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local governments and 
authorities within its territories.”  Id. at art. XXIV. 
 127. Edward T. Hayes, Changing Notions of Sovereignty and Federalism in the International 
Economic System: A Reassessment of WTO Regulation of Federal States and the Regional and 
Local Governments Within Their Territories, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 30 (2004). 
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generally stated in its written and oral submissions that state laws 
restricting gambling might be in violation of GATS, while the focus of 
its complaint was on U.S. federal law.128  The panel, however, reviewed 
eight state laws that restricted online gambling, and found that four of 
them were inconsistent with GATS.129  The panel also found that 
provisions of U.S. federal law restricting online gambling were in 
violation of America’s GATS obligations.130 
In April 2005, a WTO appellate panel reversed the decision of the 
November 2004 panel in regards to the state laws.  The appellate panel 
found that since Antigua did not detail how the state laws violated 
GATS in its submissions it had not established a prima facie case of 
inconsistency.  The lower panel was therefore wrong to examine these 
state laws when they had not been seriously contested by either side.131 
The appellate panel did not find that the state laws in question were 
consistent with America’s GATS obligations or they could not be 
challenged in the future, only that Antigua had not made a prima facie 
case of inconsistency.  The lower panel’s decision demonstrates that 
WTO panels are willing to find that state laws conflict with WTO 
obligations.  It also shows Antigua might have some likelihood of 
success if it challenged state laws that restricted online gambling in the 
WTO in the future. 
Although striking down the lower panel’s finding against state 
laws, the April 2005 appellate panel decision held that certain U.S. 
federal laws restricting online gambling were inconsistent with GATS.  
In 2006, the United States adopted a bill that outlawed banks and other 
financial institutions from processing online gambling transactions.132 In 
March 2007, a WTO panel found that the U.S. had yet to comply with 
the April 2005 appellate panel decision.133  It is still uncertain how this 
ongoing controversy will be resolved and if state laws restricting online 
gambling will eventually be challenged by Antigua in the WTO. 
It is likely that the number of challenges made to state and local 
 
 128. Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling 
and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (April 7, 2005), par. ¶¶ 149-50. 
 129. Id. ¶¶ 151-52. 
 130. Id. ¶ 5 
 131. Id. ¶¶ 149-56 
 132. US Online Law Takes Effect, BBCCARIBBEAN.COM, Oct. 13, 2006, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2006/10/061013_antiguagaming.shtml (last visited Apr. 
21, 2007). 
 133. Antigua Scores Again Over the US, BBCCARIBBEAN.COM, Mar. 30, 2007 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2007/03/070330_antiguawto3003.shtml (last visited 
May 3, 2007). 
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regulations and judicial decisions will only increase in the WTO and 
under international trade agreements like NAFTA.  Meanwhile, the 
United States also has responsibilities under a number of international 
human rights and labor agreements to which it is a party.  Unlike under 
trade agreements, in which trade penalties can be levied against the 
United States for noncompliance, the United States cannot be punished 
for noncompliance with human rights agreements beyond reprimand and 
bringing international attention to the breach. 
The actions of localities have come to the attention of the oversight 
bodies of several of the human rights agreements.  The UN Human 
Rights Commission that monitors compliance with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires periodic reports from 
states that have ratified the Covenant.  In July 2006, when the United 
States submitted its report, Commission members raised concerns about 
a number of state and local policies.134  These concerns ranged from a 
proposal to punish child sex offenders with the death penalty in South 
Carolina, police brutality in Chicago, disenfranchisement of criminals in 
Florida, the death of the homeless during a heat wave in Arizona, and 
widespread disenfranchisement in New Orleans in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina.135  Members also made observations that implicated 
state and local governance more generally from racial profiling by local 
law enforcement to the high number of juveniles sentenced to life 
imprisonment without parole.136  The Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights has heard several cases which implicate states actions that 
charge the U.S. is in violation of its commitments under the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.137  The new Human Rights 
Council has mandatory reporting procedures for members of the United 
Nations138 that will inevitably place U.S. state and local action that 
affects human rights under international scrutiny. 
Although not specifically a human rights tribunal, the International 
Court of Justice has enforced consular rights in cases involving the death 
penalty.  In Avena, the ICJ found that 54 Mexican nationals on the death 
 
 134. See generally U.N.  Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Comm., 
Consideration of Reports under Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/Sr.2380 (July 27, 
2006). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Most of these cases involve the use of the death penalty by states.  E.g., Javier Suarez 
Medina v. United States, Case 12.421, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 91/05, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, 
doc. 5 (2005) available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/91-05.html. 
 138. G.A. Res. 251, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., at 5(e), U.N. Doc. A/60/L.48 (2006), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/A.RES.60.251_En.pdf 
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rows of various states had not been given their consular rights in 
violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.139  The ICJ 
ordered the United States to review and reconsider their cases.140  The 
United States accepted the ruling, and President Bush issued a 
memorandum to the Attorney General directing the states to abide by the 
decision.141  It is unclear whether states are bound by Bush’s memo or 
the I.C.J. decision.142  As a result of this controversy, the United States 
has withdrawn from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, which gave the ICJ jurisdiction over claimed 
violations of the Convention.143 
Besides the unknown binding effect of Avena, the decisions of 
international tribunals are generally not directly binding on American 
localities.  U.S. courts though may grant considerable weight to these 
bodies’ decisions, or even these bodies’ consideration of certain matters, 
in determining whether to preempt a state or local policy that affects 
U.S. foreign affairs.  For example, the Supreme Court in Crosby noted 
that the European Community and Japan had lodged a complaint with 
the WTO that the Massachusetts Burma Law violated U.S. obligations 
under the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). 144  The Court 
specifically pointed to the WTO complaint as evidence that the 
Massachusetts Act was hampering the ability of the President to speak 
with one voice for the nation on the issue of Burma.145  It also cited a 
statement by the Assistant Secretary of State that the Massachusetts Act 
was injuring the U.S.’s ability to negotiate with the EU to create an 
effective Burma strategy.146  In the future, these statements may give 
added weight to heightened legislative preemption as in Crosby or be 
used to justify the invocation of executive foreign relations power 
preemption as in Garamendi.  Further, if the Court were to resurrect 
Zschernig, it might find that localities’ actions, which merely create 
 
 139. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 
(Mar. 31). 
 140. Id. at 23. 
 141. Memorandum from President George W. Bush for the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html. 
 142. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666 (2005) (deciding that the Supreme Court will not 
hear appeals involving the Avena or the Bush memos until all remedies in state courts have been 
exhausted); Napier-El v. Johnson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40798, *14 n.18 (finding that the status of 
states’ obligations under the Avena decision were uncertain) 
 143. Adam Liptak, U.S. Says it has Withdrawn from World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
10, 2005, at A16. 
 144. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 383 (2000). 
 145. Id. at 382-83. 
 146. Id. at 383-84. 
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controversy before an international tribunal, could be struck down under 
the dormant foreign affairs power.  A court might also find that 
localities’ actions that interfered with the trade commitments of the 
United States might be preempted by the heightened dormant foreign 
commerce clause. 
International tribunals create additional political pressure on 
localities to change their policies as well.  For example, in 2004, the 
Florida state legislature amended a tax on Brazilian orange juice after 
being heavily lobbied to do so by the U.S. government after Brazil filed 
a WTO complaint against the tax.147  The Florida state legislature had a 
choice between retaining its discriminatory orange juice tax policy or 
inviting the ire of the federal government.  With the prospect of the 
entire United States being punished for its actions in the WTO, it backed 
down and amended the tax. 
Certainly, some state and local policies deserve international 
examination and condemnation.  Such scrutiny, however, also takes 
away local control.  The Florida juice tax or the Massachusetts Burma 
Act might be viewed as protectionist trade policies or representing 
parochial interests, but they also reflect local values.  It is not the task of 
international trade tribunals to weigh the value of free trade versus these 
local concerns, nor are these tribunals particularly well-placed to weigh 
these competing interests.  The answer is not to abandon international 
agreements, whether in trade or human rights, but instead to involve 
localities more when the United States is negotiating these agreements. 
Most important for purposes of this article, it should be the federal 
government and not courts that decide whether specific local policies 
should be preempted when these policies come under the scrutiny of 
international bodies.  The Florida orange juice tax case demonstrates that 
the federal government is willing and able to intervene when U.S. 
foreign policy interests are truly threatened by localities’ actions even 
when the locality in question (Florida) has disproportionate weight in 
American electoral politics. 
III. JUSTIFYING PARTIALLY DECENTRALIZED FOREIGN RELATIONS 
In Garamendi the Supreme Court stated: 
There is, of course, no question that at some point an exercise of state 
power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National 
 
 147. Todd Benson, Brazil Resolves Complaint On Florida Juice-Import Tax, N.Y. TIMES, May 
29, 2004, at C3. 
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Government’s policy, given the ‘concern for uniformity in this 
country’s dealings with foreign nations’ that animated the 
Constitution’s allocation of the foreign relations power to the National 
Government in the first place.148 
This echoes Madison’s concerns in Federalist 42 where he wrote 
“[i]f we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in 
respect of other nations.”149  As Part I showed, the Court has generally 
found the argument that the nation must speak with “one voice” highly 
persuasive.  Except for in dormant foreign commerce clause cases, the 
Court has usually found that a plea to “one voice” in foreign affairs 
trumps competing state concerns.150 
The Court’s jurisprudence not only dramatically preferences the 
federal over the state and local in issues that touch on foreign relations it 
also biases power allocation toward the President, whom the Court has 
found has the “vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign 
 
 148. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003). 
 149. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 232 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also, 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The peace of 
the whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a part.”). 
 150. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381. 
The state Act undermines the President’s capacity, in this instance for effective 
diplomacy.  It is not merely that the differences between the state and federal Acts in 
scope and type of sanctions threaten to complicate discussions; they compromise the 
very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with 
other governments. 
 Id. (emphasis added). 
[I]n discussing the Import-Export Clause, this Court, in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 
423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976), spoke of the Framers’ overriding concern that ‘the Federal 
Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with 
foreign governments.’ The need for federal uniformity is no less paramount in 
ascertaining the negative implications of Congress’ power to ‘regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations’ under the Commerce Clause. 
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (emphasis added).  “[W]e are 
constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence 
and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other 
members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.”  
Bano Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).  “The law thus ‘compromise[s] the 
very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other 
governments’ to resolve claims against European companies arising out of World War II.” 
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 424. (citing Crosby 530 U.S. at 381) (emphasis added).  See also Chae 
Chan Ping 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (“For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but 
for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one 
nation, one power.”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (“Our system of government is 
such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the 
whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left 
entirely free from local interference.”). 
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relations.”151 
This section first argues that the United States has never spoken 
with “one voice” in foreign relations, so any unequivocal appeal to the 
“one voice” doctrine is misleading.  Second, it lays out a number of 
benefits to decentralizing foreign relations and addresses some of the 
critiques of such decentralization.  Finally, it finds that although there 
are areas of foreign policy where the federal government should speak 
with a united voice unfettered by localities’ actions courts are not well-
suited to determine these instances.  Given that the nation rarely has a 
united voice in foreign relations and given the complexity of the 
potential benefits and drawbacks of localities’ actions that affect foreign 
relations, the courts should only strike down localities’ actions that are 
explicitly preempted by the legislature, the executive, or the 
Constitution. 
1. America’s Multiple Voices 
Although the executive is often the privileged voice in foreign 
affairs, it must also compete with the legislative and judicial branches.152  
For example, the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles was a 
harsh rebuke to Woodrow Wilson’s support for the League of Nations.  
More recently, calls from Congress to withdraw troops from Iraq have 
differed from, and perhaps undermined, President Bush’s stated plans. 
A plethora of non-state actors symbolize, and in many ways speak 
for, the United States abroad as well.  These actors include large 
American companies that invest in foreign countries; the entertainment 
industry, which dramatically shapes culture abroad; American 
missionaries who have started religious denominations and movements 
across the globe; U.S. unions which have financially and otherwise 
supported foreign unions in labor struggles; and U.S. based 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that may provide aid to other 
countries or be critical of some foreign governments’ policies. 
The actions of these non-state actors are rarely condemned by the 
U.S. government even though they often complicate relations with 
foreign countries.  Indeed, the U.S. government can do little to control 
the behavior of most of these actors.  U.S. sanctions against a country 
can prevent many of these non-state actors from operating in a specific 
 
 151. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 152. See Generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the ‘One-Voice’ Myth in U.S. Foreign 
Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 989 (2001). 
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country, but sanctions are blunt and heavy-handed instruments that are 
difficult to use against a specific actor that is disrupting the federal 
government’s ability to speak with “one voice” in foreign relations.  
Laws like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act153 and the Alien Tort 
Claims Act154 provide some avenues for regulating how these non-state 
actors affect foreign relations, but such laws tend to be the exception and 
not the norm. 
State and local governments are arguably seen as representing the 
U.S. government abroad in a more official capacity than U.S. non-state 
actors.  The governments of these localities are democratically elected 
and so it is more likely that they will be seen as acting on behalf of the 
American people.  Additionally, the federal government generally has a 
greater ability to control the actions of these localities than non-state 
actors.  Therefore, there is a greater chance that nonintervention by the 
federal government to stop offensive activity will be seen as federal 
endorsement of such activity. 
Such logic though should caution against court intervention in these 
cases rather than encourage it.  If localities’ actions damage U.S. foreign 
policy interests, the federal government can easily preempt the state or 
local policies in question.  Further, with the world’s increased 
interconnectedness, it is more likely that if a foreign government takes 
offense to a locality’s policy it can discriminate between the policy of 
the locality and the policy of the federal government.155 
2. Benefits of Decentralizing Foreign Relations 
Democracy that takes place at the level of the nation-state has long 
been considered suspect.  As Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte observe in 
Size and Democracy, two thousand years of democratic theory either 
explicitly or implicitly presupposed that democracy could only work on 
a very local level.156  The first democracies were city-states whose 
citizens practiced a form of limited direct democracy.157  Both Plato and 
 
 153. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 (West 2006). 
 154. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2006). 
 155. Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 
653 (2002). 
 156. ROBERT A. DAHL & EDWARD R. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 55 (1973). 
 157. Greek city-states, like Athens, did not give women or slaves the right to participate in 
their democracies.  Over two thousand years later, the United States that De Tocqueville traveled 
still disenfranchised these same groups both nationally and at a local level.  Neither Ancient Athens 
nor the United States of the 1840s could rightly be considered a democracy today. The models they 
provide for direct and participatory democracy are entangled in a history of oppression that only 
allowed for the empowerment of some.  Lessons drawn from these two experiences must take this 
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Aristotle assumed in their work that democracy would only occur in 
city-state like units of governance.  For instance, Plato uses the example 
of a population of 5,040 as an ideal number of citizens for a 
democracy.158 
Montesquieu and Rousseau, two of the thinkers who most 
influenced the founders of the United States, both believed in small scale 
democracy and largely believed democracy could only successfully take 
place at this level.  Rousseau argued for small direct democracies and 
cautioned that “[t]he moment a people allows itself to be represented, it 
is no longer free: it no longer exists.”159  In contrast to Rousseau, 
Montesquieu wrote that representatives of the people were better at 
discussing public affairs and making decisions for the community than 
the people as a whole.160  He also felt, however, that democracy was not 
well-suited to a large country because it was too difficult to foster trust 
and a sense of public good on this scale.161 
Inheriting a vast geographic area and a relatively large population 
(approximately 3.9 million people in 1790),162 the United States adopted 
a representative form of democracy on a national scale.  Commitment to 
democracy at the state and local level, however, remained strong.  De 
Tocqueville’s snapshot of the United States in Democracy in America 
showed the continued liveliness of democratic institutions at a municipal 
level in the early 1800s.163  An allegiance to states and regions was so 
overwhelming in the 1850s and 1860s that it created the preconditions 
for the South to attempt to form their own union during the Civil War. 
Since the Civil War, there has been a general centralization of 
political power to the federal government, most notably during 
Reconstruction and the New Deal.  In the 1930s, federal expenditures 
 
systematic disenfranchisement into account.  See ANDREA DWORKIN, Women in the Public Domain, 
in LIFE AND DEATH: UNAPOLOGETIC WRITINGS ON THE CONTINUING WAR AGAINST WOMEN 196-
97 (1997) (on how Athenian democracy kept women out of public political life). 
 158. PLATO, Laws, bk. V, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 686, 692 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952); Plato, Laws, bk. VI, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 697, 706 
(Benjamin Jowett trans., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952).  See generally, Aristotle, Politics, bk. 
V, in The Works of Aristotle Vol. II, in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD VOL. 9 (Benjamin 
Jowett trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952). 
 159. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, bk. 3, Ch. 15, in GREAT BOOKS OF THE 
WESTERN WORLD VOL. 38, at 422 (G.D.H. Cole trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952). 
 160. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. XI, Ch. 6, at 177 (Thomas Nugent trans., 
Robert Clark & Co. 1873). 
 161. Id. at bk. VIII, Ch. 16. 
 162. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL 
TIMES TO 1970, pt. 1, at 8 (1975). 
 163. The direct democracy De Tocqueville documented in Democracy in America occurred in 
New England townships of two to three thousand people.  DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 64. 
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per year finally became greater than local expenditures.164  State and 
local democracy did not necessarily become less vibrant during this 
progression, but localities lost relative power over their citizens in 
relation to the federal government.  Further, Americans’ political 
identities became less attached to their region, state, or town and more 
linked to the country as a whole. 
The country though has also seen countervailing trends.  The 
second half of the 20th century saw a relative expansion of state and 
local government in relation to the federal government although federal 
spending remained significantly higher throughout.  State and local 
expenditures have increased from 1950 to 2001 from 5.6% of GDP to 
9.8%.165  During this same period, overall federal government 
expenditures changed relatively little, ranging from 15% to 23% of GDP 
(15.6% in 1950 and 18.4% in 2001).  These overall federal numbers 
mask an important trend though because the Reagan presidency saw the 
beginning of a large drop in federal spending that was not defense, 
interest payments, or transfers (4.1% of GDP in 1980, 2.2% in 1988, and 
2% in 2001).166  Meanwhile state and local spending consistently 
increased during this time (8.6% of GDP in 1980, 9.2% in 1988, and 
9.8% in 2001).167  This change in federal, state, and local expenditures 
along with Supreme Court decisions supporting state rights and a general 
shift in public opinion for greater federalism indicates a moderate trend 
towards decentralizing many aspects of governance over the last 25 
years in the United States.168 
Federal systems are often adopted out of political necessity to 
accommodate religious, ethnic, or linguistic differences between groups 
from different geographic areas within the same country.  These groups 
are granted guarantees of limited autonomy while the central 
government is granted limited overall control.  This article does not 
examine the political necessity of American federalism.  Instead, three 
other traditional justifications of federalism in the United States are 
 
 164. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956). 
 165. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, tlb. 15.3 - Total Government Expenditures as 
Percentages of GDP: 1947-2001 (2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/pdf/hist.pdf. 
 166. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, tlb. 15.5 - Total Government Expenditures by Major 
Category of Expenditure as Percentages of GDP: 1947-2001 (2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/pdf/hist.pdf. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Generally, John D. Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and 
America’s Devolution Debate, 11 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 73, 74 (1997). 
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highlighted and explicitly adopted to show the benefits of more 
decentralized foreign relations.  These are the following: (1) federalism 
creates a greater diversity of policies which are more locally relevant, 
more economically efficient, and/or allow for more experimentation 
with less risk to the nation as a whole; (2) federalism provides a check 
on the over-centralization of power; and (3) federalism fosters thicker 
citizens by creating a more participatory and locally relevant democratic 
process. 
First, federalism allows for and fosters a greater diversity of 
policies.  Decentralization can allow for a number of governmental 
subunits to work on the same problem creating what Jack Walker calls a 
“national system of emulation and competition”169 while also taking into 
account local conditions and preferences.  In a similar vein, Charles 
Tiebout famously argued that if “consumer-voters” are mobile and have 
full information they will sort amongst bundles of public goods offered 
by competing local governments, thereby leading to the distribution of 
public goods in an optimal manner.170 
Certainly, not all localities perform equally well at developing and 
adapting new policies.  Research has shown that wealthier states tend to 
be more innovative although local political situations are in large part 
determinative as well.171  There is also reason to believe localities are 
best at determining solutions to middle-level difficulty problems as large 
problems often require more resources than are at their disposal while 
decentralization can often confuse remedies for smaller problems.172  
With these limitations in mind, however, localities are remarkably 
adaptive, often correctly pinpointing problems and finding new solutions 
before the federal government does. 
Dissenting from New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, Justice Brandeis 
summarizes the frequently invoked idea that states can be laboratories 
for experimentation: 
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave 
responsibility.  Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with 
serious consequences to the Nation.  It is one of the happy incidents of 
 
 169. Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States 63 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 880, 898 (1969). 
 170. Tiebout, supra note 170.  For a brief overview of the literature criticizing the theoretical 
problems of the Tiebout model see Ken Kollman, John H. Miller & Scott E. Page, Political 
Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 977, 978-79 (1997). 
 171. See generally, Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 1174, 1185 (1973). 
 172. Ken Kollman, John H. Miller & Scott E. Page, Decentralization and the Search for Policy 
Solutions, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 102, 104 (2000). 
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the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.173 
Of course, if state and local policies affect foreign relations, such 
experimentation is not “without risk to the rest of the country.”174  
Localities’ policies that antagonize other countries could sour relations 
with important trade partners, needed political allies, or belligerent 
enemies.  Although such dangers should be seriously considered, they 
are often overstated while in other cases the larger benefits of state or 
local action in foreign relations may be worth the potential for some 
limited adverse consequences.  Further, the federal government can 
preempt localities’ policies that it finds endanger the country or its 
foreign policy. 
State trade missions are an example of state action directed abroad 
that carries little risk for the nation as a whole.  States may tailor these 
missions to the special needs of their business communities.  The diverse 
tactics and goals of these missions may ultimately be more successful at 
developing business ties with other countries than if all efforts were 
concentrated through the U.S. government. 
A number of areas of formerly local or national concern that have 
become internationalized, such as environmental policy, also benefit 
from decentralization.  Within the framework of minimum national 
standards, localities can experiment with creative new environmental 
policies, defraying risk for the country and creating support for 
successful policies. 
Second, federalism provides a check on the over-centralization of 
power.  Federalism embraces a “conception of justice” that implies that a 
diffuse political ordering is both “necessary and desirable.”175  In 
Federalist 51, James Madison reassures his readers that a federalist 
 
 173. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  See 
also, Justice Powell in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 567-68 
n.13 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The Court does not explain how leaving the States virtually at 
the mercy of the Federal Government, without recourse to judicial review, will enhance their 
opportunities to experiment and serve as ‘laboratories.’”); Justice O’Connor in Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787-88 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“Court’s decision undermines the most valuable aspects of our federalism. Courts and 
commentators frequently have recognized that the 50 states serve as laboratories for the 
development of new social, economic, and political ideas.”).  Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering 
States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1325 
(2004). 
 174. There are potential spillover affects to many state domestic policies as well. 
 175. DANIEL ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 84 (1987). 
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republic provides a “double security” against usurpations of power 
because power is not only divided between the different branches of the 
federal government, but also between the federal and state 
governments.176  Justice O’Connor picks up this theme in Gregory v. 
Ashcroft where she remarks that “[j]ust as the separation and 
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government 
serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, 
a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal 
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either 
front.”177 
As areas of traditional local governance increasingly become 
objects of international concern there is an increased danger that 
localities will be weakened in their ability to act as a counterweight to 
federal and international power.  Further, localities can play an active 
role in checking abuses of federal foreign policy in areas not 
traditionally associated with local governance. 
For example, localities may be able to resist perceived misuses of 
federal power that touch on foreign relations if they require the 
assistance of local authorities to implement.  Several cities, such as San 
Francisco and Detroit, have passed resolutions denouncing the U.S. 
Patriot Act, and some cities have even gone so far as to decline to 
provide assistance to federal authorities in any instance where civil 
liberties might be jeopardized.178 
As will be discussed in the next section, localities have also taken a 
number of actions to oppose or attempt to change federal foreign policy, 
such as passing resolutions condemning the war in Iraq or adopting 
“Buy America” laws.  These actions in and of themselves may have 
questionable impact on any perceived abuses of foreign policy decision-
making power in Washington D.C., but they mobilize citizens around 
foreign policy issues at a local level. 
This mobilization of citizens is perhaps the greatest check on 
usurpations of power by the federal government and leads to the third 
justification for federalism in foreign relations: federalism creates 
control and independence at a local and state level which encourages 
 
 176. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 177. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). See also Chief Justice Rehnquist in 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“This constitutionally mandated division of 
authority ‘was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties.’”); Justice 
Scalia in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (“The separation of the two spheres is 
one of the Constitution’s protections of liberty.”).  Chemerinsky, supra note 179, at 1325. 
 178. Vikram David Amar, Converse § 1983 Suits in Which States Police Federal Agents: An 
Idea Whose Time Has Arrived, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (2004). 
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citizen participation and empowerment.179 
Although fewer people vote in local elections than in national 
elections (in part because local elections tend to be more lop-sided 
affairs), more people try to influence local politics than national 
politics.180  State and local politicians are usually more accessible than 
national ones.  It is also often easier to create local and state 
constituencies.  Sometimes these state or local constituencies are 
connected with or develop into national constituencies, but it is the 
chance to participate locally and impact the governance of one’s locality 
that often mobilizes those involved.  The idea that local action may then 
turn into a national movement can create synergetic inspiration. 
State and local democracy leads to large reservoirs of engaged and 
committed citizens participating in a diverse array of political 
communities.  Not every citizen will take the opportunity to engage with 
the governments of their localities, but many will.  Local political 
communities’ involvement in questions of foreign relations ensures that 
debates around these topics will occur at multiple levels of government 
and in multiple forums.  With pools of active and committed citizens, it 
is then more likely these citizens can and will check an overzealous 
Congress or executive.  The involvement of engaged political classes in 
localities who also participate in national politics makes it more likely 
that the potential for tyranny in the federal government’s policies will be 
checked both here and abroad. 
To further illuminate localities’ role in foreign relations, it is 
helpful to address three critiques of decentralizing foreign relations that 
also draw off of traditional critiques of federalism in general.  First, the 
federal government has superior resources and expertise in foreign 
relations so localities’ involvement in foreign relations will therefore 
lead to unwise or underdeveloped foreign policy.  Second, given 
freedom in the arena of foreign policy, localities may pursue unjust 
policies.  Third, involvement of localities in foreign relations confuses 
who is accountable for foreign policy. 
The federal government has an unmatched institutional capacity to 
develop, shape, and implement a comprehensive foreign policy for the 
nation.  Many state and local representatives are rightly hesitant to take 
on foreign policy issues because they correctly perceive their expertise 
to be in local decision-making and not in foreign decision-making.  
Individual citizens often find themselves similarly intimidated by foreign 
 
 179. ELAZAR, supra note 181, at 8. 
 180. DAHL & TUFTE, supra note 162, at 55-57. 
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policy matters. 
Max Weber observed that “[u]nder normal conditions, the power 
position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always overtowering.  The 
‘political master’ finds himself in the position of the ‘dilettante’ who 
stands opposite the ‘expert,’ facing the trained official who stands within 
the management of administration.”181  There is perhaps no bureaucracy 
as seemingly impenetrable to citizens as that which has developed 
around foreign relations.  Multiple agencies deal with a plethora of 
issues that surround our relations with countries.  Citizens often know 
little about the countries with which these agencies deal.  Terms like 
“national security” and “national interest” often intimidatingly loom in 
the background.  Even the term “foreign relations” still connotes a 
certain degree of untouchable importance and danger. 
The information and expertise differential between local and federal 
decision-makers and officials may seem overpowering when looked at 
broadly,182 but local and state officials actually have a potential 
information advantage in many foreign relations issues such as fostering 
trade.  Further, with an interconnected world a great deal of information 
is available to legislators, and they have become savvier at interpreting 
it.  State and local legislators can also take their cue from the federal 
government.  For example, the legislators of many localities likely felt 
more comfortable condemning the regime in Sudan after the federal 
government stated genocide was occurring in Darfur.  Most importantly, 
localities are not developing a comprehensive foreign policy, but instead 
are crafting a foreign policy that furthers their localities’ more limited 
interests. 
A second critique of federalism is that if localities are given too 
much power they will pursue narrow-minded or unjust ends.  Madison 
wrote in Federalist 10 that the tyranny of the majority could be checked 
more easily in a larger country because it was less likely they would 
share common enough interests to consistently suppress the rights of 
 
 181. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 232 (H. H. Gerth and C. Wright 
Mills eds. and trans., 1946). 
 182. Id. at 229 (“The ruled for their part cannot dispense with or replace the bureaucratic 
apparatus of authority once it exists.  For this bureaucracy rests upon expert training, a functional 
specialization of work, and an attitude set for habitual and virtuoso-like mastery of single yet 
methodically integrated functions.  If the official stops working, or if his work is forcefully 
interrupted, chaos results, and it is difficult to improvise replacements from among the governed 
who are fit to master such chaos.”).  Of course, no one is suggesting the U.S. dispense with its 
federal foreign policy bureaucracy, but only also allow a space for state and local decision-making 
in foreign relations. 
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others.183  Indeed, many who grew up during the Civil Rights era in the 
United States associate state and local governments with racist laws in 
the American South that were entrenched in localities.  These laws were 
only ultimately purged through the commitment of the national 
government.  Many have argued for international human rights and trade 
regimes so that people and markets under localities’ control are not 
subject to parochial policies. They claim that localities’ actions not in 
line with these commitments can only weaken the high standards of 
these international regimes. 
There are at least two reasons to doubt the validity of this criticism.  
First, if localities are not involved in and do not accept the validity of 
international agreements, these agreements can seem hollow and 
illegitimate no matter how just their goals purport to be.  International 
agreements and the norms they promote are not as likely to be 
successfully internalized without local involvement and participation in 
the development, contestation, and implementation of these agreements. 
Second, history has shown localities were often on the forefront of 
causes of justice.  An examination of American history shows a number 
of notable examples where state and local governments took the lead in 
protecting basic human rights.  For example, the Constitution initially 
entrenched a system that would favor the continuation of slavery.184  
While the federal government actively condoned slavery, northern states 
banned its practice and worked towards its national abolition. 
Localities also pushed women’s suffrage before the national 
government.  In 1869 the Wyoming territory accorded women equal 
rights with men to vote and hold office, and in 1890 it entered the United 
States as the first woman-suffrage state.185  By 1917, 11 states – all in 
the west – had full suffrage for women.186  Suffrage advocates used the 
example of these states to successfully lobby for the 19th amendment, 
which was adopted in 1920. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to predict if greater or less 
federal or local control over the issues of slavery or women’s suffrage 
would have hastened or slowed these moves towards freedom and 
equality at the national level.  Both the abolitionist and suffrage 
 
 183. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 184. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 20-21 (2005). 
 185. Id. at 419. 
 186. THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE YEARBOOK 1917, at 21 (Martha Stapler ed., 1917), available at  
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=rbnawsa&fileName=n7468/rbnawsan7468.db&recNum=19&itemLink=r?amme
m/naw:@field(DOCID+@lit(rbnawsan7468div11)):%23n7468020&linkText=1. 
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movements, however, leveraged state and local action to pursue their 
national objectives.  A certain decentralization of power to localities 
should appeal to any advocate for justice.  State and local governments 
have an important role to play in decrying the injustices of the federal 
government and international treaty regimes. 
A third critique of federalism emphasizes the decrease in 
accountability as more levels of government become involved in an area 
of policy.  In many ways accountability for foreign relations, however, 
remains much clearer in a partially decentralized system than in most 
areas of domestic policy.  The federal government is clearly to blame for 
mistakes in a distant war and not one’s local or state government.  
Meanwhile, a state government is to blame for a state trade mission that 
mishandles tax payer money without producing any business for the 
state.  Similarly, although a citizen should not expect their state to end 
apartheid in South Africa, they may hold them accountable for not 
joining a divestment campaign aimed at this goal.  Citizens should not 
hold their locality’s government accountable for the unfolding of world 
events, but they can hold it accountable for how it reacts to these events. 
Dahl and Tufte observe that “[n]o single type of size of unit is 
optimal for achieving the twin goals of citizen effectiveness and system 
capacity.”187  When the federal government all but monopolized foreign 
relations, it seemed difficult for a citizen to impact formulation of these 
policies.  Today, localities have an increasingly larger role as actors in 
foreign relations.  It is generally easier for citizens to affect their 
localities’ policies than to affect national ones.  Most localities, however, 
do not have the capacity to have much effect on large global issues.  
Instead, their goals in foreign relations must be more modest: fostering 
productive trade and other exchanges with other countries, protecting 
their own values and markets, decrying international injustices, or 
pressuring the federal government to change its foreign policy in line 
with the localities’ interests.  In a globalized world, foreign relations 
become a broader concept.  Both the federal government and state and 
local governments have increased responsibility in foreign relations.  In 
turn, we should work to democratize foreign relations at all these levels 
of government recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of each level of 
government. 
 
 187. DAHL & TUFTE, supra note 162, at 138. 
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3. Judicial Implications 
The U.S. has never spoken with “one voice” in foreign relations 
and certainly does not today.  Further, the benefits of decentralizing 
foreign policy to include the involvement of localities are numerous.  
Given the pervasive nature of globalization, there is little reason to 
believe foreign relations should be the soul domain of the federal 
government.  Instead, as Judith Resnik has argued more generally, 
categories in federalism are rarely truly bounded.  We should recognize 
“that many categories are intertwined in lawmaking enterprises and that 
more than one source of legal regulation is likely to apply to any set of 
behaviors.”188 
There are clearly times that the U.S. must act with a united voice, 
but the legislature and executive are better suited than the judiciary to 
determine when localities’ actions are a genuine threat to the nation’s 
foreign relations interests.189  These branches are better acquainted with 
the nation’s foreign policy and can more efficiently and accurately target 
localities’ actions that adversely affect foreign relations than courts.  
Also, giving broad preemption power to the judiciary may result in 
diverse decisions by lower courts in the same area of foreign relations, 
creating further confusion.190  Therefore, courts should abandon their 
heightened preemption analysis in the field of foreign relations.  They 
should only preempt localities’ actions in foreign relations when they are 
explicitly required to by the executive, the legislature, or the 
Constitution. 
Although courts should let the other branches of government 
regulate localities’ actions in foreign relations, courts are better suited to 
determine when their own actions may adversely affect foreign relations.  
As a result, there may be instances when a court should find a dispute 
nonjusticiable because of the implication of a judgment on foreign 
relations.  When coming to such a conclusion, the court should weigh 
the interest localities have in the judicial resolution of these cases.  A 
court should not overestimate the need to use these doctrines of 
nonjusticiability.  Frequently a decision will not have as dire 
consequences on foreign relations as the courts imagine.  Further, the 
executive and Congress can often pass laws to limit courts’ jurisdiction 
if they do overreach.  Finally, an overzealous use of the act of state and 
 
 188. Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE 
L.J. 619, 622 (2001). 
 189. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 1714. 
 190. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 1694. 
40
Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 4, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss4/3
ROBINSONFINAL.DOC 5/14/2007  12:48:46 PM 
2007] CITIZENS NOT SUBJECTS 687 
political question doctrines on issues that affect foreign relations will 
keep courts out of an ever-increasing number of disputes, many of which 
could benefit from the judiciary’s intervention. 
IV. IN CONTEXT: LOCALITIES’ ACTIONS THAT AFFECT FOREIGN 
RELATIONS 
Not all localities’ actions that affect foreign relations do so in the 
same way.  Such actions may: (1) foster exchange and cooperation with 
other countries; (2) protect or promote local markets and/or values in a 
manner that affects foreign relations; (3) judge other countries’ behavior; 
or (4) influence the federal government’s foreign policy.  Localities may 
also (5) adopt or borrow from international or foreign law.  This part of 
the article provides examples for each of these categories to make the 
implications of the arguments laid out so far more tangible. 
These examples demonstrate the varied and sometimes complex 
ways localities affect foreign relations.  Some brief analysis is given to 
demonstrate how foreign relations law is constraining or could constrain 
localities’ actions in each of the five categories.  In particular, localities’ 
actions that affect foreign relations in categories two and three are most 
likely to come under the scrutiny of domestic law, while activities in 
category two are most likely to be found suspect by international law. 
These examples, however, also show that no category is without 
scrutiny from U.S. law.  Some actions may fit into more than one 
category.  For example, a procurement policy like the one at issue in 
Crosby may be an attempt to influence foreign policy (category four), 
but it also fits in categories two and three.  Further, if localities are 
consistently told by the courts that their business is not foreign relations, 
this may have a chilling effect on activities in all of these categories. 
1. Policies that Foster Exchange and Cooperation with Other Countries 
Localities’ policies that foster exchange and cooperation with other 
countries are one of the least scrutinized categories under domestic or 
international law.  State and local governments’ involvement in these 
activities, however, especially concerning trade promotion, demonstrates 
how localities have become not just occasional, but routine international 
actors.  Arguably, America’s foreign policy gains more from these 
numerous and diverse exchanges to promote business with other 
countries by localities than if the federal government attempted to 
centralize this cooperation.  Localities emulate each other’s tactics to 
strengthen exchanges with foreign countries and often compete for 
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business.  Citizens also become engaged in these exchanges, thereby 
furthering citizen involvement and exposure to foreign affairs. 
Bayless Manning noted in the 1970s that “[t]he economic 
interdependence of the modern world is more than international. It is 
also inter-local.”191  Indeed, localities today tirelessly promote economic 
activity with foreign countries and foreign localities both to create 
markets for their products and to attract overseas investment.192 
Although states have long sent trade delegations abroad, the 
number of these delegations increased greatly during the 1990s as states 
gained a new awareness of the importance of international trade, the 
amount of international trade increased, and larger state budgets made 
such delegations possible.193  In 1980 there were only four overseas 
offices maintained by states, but by 2002 this had increased to 240 
overseas offices.194  States also cooperate with one another to coordinate 
economic outreach overseas.195  Friendship state or partnership 
relationships between states and subunits of other countries are created 
to encourage trade and cultural exchange as well.196  Cities across the 
U.S. have promoted their businesses through sister-city programs197 as 
well as through the U.S. Conference of Mayors. 
Other countries or sub-national units often make specific attempts 
to create stronger economic ties with specific states.  For example, at 
 
 191. Bayless Manning, The Congress, The Executive, and Intermestic Affairs: Three 
Proposals, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 306, 309 (1977). 
 192. See generally, Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems: A National 
Perspective on the Benefits of State Participation, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1015, 1028-33 (2001). 
 193. CHRIS WHATLEY, STATE OFFICIAL’S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3 (2003), 
available at http://www.csg.org/pubs/Documents/SOG03InternationalAffairs.pdf. 
 194. Id. at 3, 49-51. 
 195. For example, the National Association of State Development Agencies (NASDA) 
organizes trade and investment missions as well as helps educate state economic development 
directors about attracting investment. NASDA Website, International Business Development 
Division Description, available at http://www.nasda.com/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2006); The Council 
of American States in Europe coordinates the activities of U.S. States with offices in Western 
Europe. EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN U.S. 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 68 (1998). 
 196. It is estimated some “90% of states maintain partnerships or working relationships with 
foreign jurisdictions.”  WHATLEY, supra note 194, at 13. 
 197. Pat Guinane, State trade office plays matchmaker as Quincy courts China, ILLINOIS 
ISSUES, Feb. 2005 (detailing trade mission sponsored by the state of Illinois between Quincy, IL, 
and its sister-city Jiaxing, China); HEIDI HOBBS, CITY HALL GOES ABROAD: THE FOREIGN POLICY 
OF LOCAL POLITICS 2 (1994) (describing how San Francisco and Shanghai created their sister-city 
relationship to help foster trade).  In 2005, “Sister Cities International represented over 2,500 
communities in 126 countries around the world.” See Sister-cities international website, Frequently 
Asked Questions at http://www.sister-cities.org/sci/aboutsci/faqs (last visited Dec. 30 2006).  Sister-
cities international is a partially federally funded organization dedicated to “increased global 
cooperation, cultural exchange, and economic development.”  Id. 
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least 35 countries have foreign trade offices in California alone.198  
Foreign leaders will meet with state government officials while touring 
the United States,199 and foreign companies will often use state 
governors as a single point of contact to navigate regulatory and political 
hurdles.200 
Some have argued that competition between state and local 
governments for business strengthens free markets and thereby creates 
greater economic growth.201  Others have argued that it is not clear such 
competition will create growth202 and express concern that such overt 
competition between localities sets off a regulatory race to the bottom 
and increases inequalities.203  Certainly, many foreign (and domestic 
companies) expect large tax breaks and other subsidies before deciding 
to start major operations in a given locality. 
Localities foster other exchanges with foreign countries that are not 
purely economic. One of the principal ways in which state and local 
governments create connections with foreign countries is by developing 
the education systems that shape their citizens global worldview, 
including the training of foreign language skills and the teaching of 
history of other countries.204 
A number of states have developed environmental partnerships with 
other countries to share knowledge and often aid these countries in their 
environmental programs.205  California Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger and British Prime Minister Tony Blair signed a formal 
 
 198. California Business Portal, Foreign Trade Offices in California, available at 
http://www.ss.ca.gov/business/ibrp/trade_offices.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2006).  Sometimes these 
foreign trade offices are sub-national units present in the United States such as the State of 
Bavaria’s, South West of England’s, or the Catalonian trade offices in California. 
 199. Office of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger, Mexico President Fox Discuss 
Pressing Cross-Border Issues at Historic, May 25, 2006, available at 
http://gov.ca.gov/index.php/press-release/816/. 
 200. Halberstam, supra note 198, at 1031. 
 201. Barry Weingast and others have argued that federalism preserves markets by devolving 
power away from the central government and forcing subunits to compete against each other in their 
policies.  Qian, Yingyi & Barry R. Weingast, Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market 
Incentives, 11(4) J. OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 83 (1997).  Ideally, such decentralization and 
deregulation will lead to growth.  Id at 85-86.  Weingast points to China and the United States as 
cases of this occurring.  See id. at 83-92. 
 202. Jonathan Rodden & Susan Rose-Ackerman. Does Federalism Preserve Markets?, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 1521, 1524 (1997) (Arguing that a federal model of competition between states may 
actually slow growth).  For example, state politicians may not always act to maximize citizen 
benefits.  There may be more points of corruption in a federal system, state level inequality may 
increase, and such a federal system may be unstable over the long term. 
 203. Donahue, supra note 174, at 73. 
 204. WHATLEY, supra note 199, at 12. 
 205. Id. at 18-19. 
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agreement in July 2006 pledging environmental cooperation between 
their two jurisdictions.206 
Since the 1990s, at least 36 states have created ties with countries 
around the world through the State Partnership Program of the National 
Guard.  For example, the Montana National Guard has provided infantry 
training to Kyrgyzstan.  As an outgrowth of this military exchange, the 
Montana Nurses Association also sent representatives to train public 
health personnel in Kyrgyzstan, and a Montana NGO has funded the 
construction of a clinic for the developmentally disabled.207  In 
December 2003, the President of Kyrgyzstan flew to Montana to meet 
with Montana’s Governor and representatives from agriculture, 
academics, the military, and other organizations.208 
2. Laws and actions that protect and promote localities’ markets and 
values in a manner that affects foreign relations 
State and local actions often protect domestic markets or values.  
These actions may be designed to specifically protect against foreigners.  
Often the regulation of markets or values by localities has merely 
incidental effects on foreigners.  With the increased internationalization 
of the areas of governance of localities, there is a greater chance for 
these incidental conflicts to arise. 
States have explicitly preferred local or U.S. companies against 
foreign companies in procurement policies.  Proponents of preferring 
local or U.S. firms in procurement policies claim that the government 
should use tax dollars to support domestic companies and spur the local 
economy.  Further, they argue domestic companies should not be 
penalized for having to comply with tighter domestic labor and 
environmental regulation. 
Thirty-seven states voluntarily agreed in the early 1990s to cover 
some of their state procurement under the WTO Agreement on 
 
 206. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov. Schwarzenegger, British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair Sign Historic Agreement to Collaborate on Climate Change, Clean Energy, Jul. 31, 2006, 
available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php/press-release/2770/. It is unclear what the status of this 
agreement is under Art. 1 Sec. 10 of the Constitution, which bars states from entering treaties with 
foreign powers. U.S CONST. art I, § 10.  Agreements of this type will likely increase in the coming 
years, and their constitutional validity will come under increasing scrutiny.  The California-UK 
agreement is seemingly non-binding, and it appears unlikely that it will be challenged. 
 207. WHATLEY, supra note 199, at 16-17. 
 208. National Guard Bureau of International Affairs website, Montana National Guard State 
Partnership Program in Kyrgyzstan, available at 
http://www.ngb.army.mil/ia/states/states/mt_kyrgyzstan.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2006). 
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Government Procurement (GPA).209  By so agreeing, these states allow 
suppliers from the other country to have an equal opportunity to compete 
for purchases in those states.210  Most states, however, still have some 
preferences for in-state bidders and firms in their state procurement 
policies.211  Several states have explicitly told the federal government 
that they will decline a foreign company’s bid for procurement contracts.  
In May 2004, the Governor of Maine rescinded his state’s commitment 
to be bound by CAFTA’s procurement rules and stated that he will 
review all future trade agreements on a case-by-case basis.212  In 2004, 
over concerns about outsourcing abroad, at least 35 states introduced 
legislation that would require that state contracts be performed inside the 
United States.213  Lower courts have been split if such “Buy American” 
laws are constitutional, and a case on this topic has not been decided in 
the wake of Crosby and Garamendi.214  Several municipalities have also 
prohibited the purchase of goods made with sweatshop labor and require 
companies receiving municipal contracts to pay a living wage.215 
Localities have taken steps to actively protect non-economic 
interests as well.  For example, several U.S. cities are members of 
United Cities and Local Governments, a U.N. affiliated organization that 
promotes cities’ interests at the U.N.  United Cities has lobbied the UN 
to create principles on decentralization and to give local governments 
 
 209. Office of the USTR, State Government Procurement and Trade Agreements, Apr. 1, 2004, 
available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2004/State_Government_Procurement_Trade_
Agreements.html. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See SELL2USGOV, State Procurement Preferences, Dec. 12, 2005, available at 
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/sell2usgov/statelawsreg-en.asp (website maintained by Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade detailing procurement preferences for all 50 
states). 
 212. Karen Imas, States Get Savvy on Trade Strategy, STATE NEWS, May 2005, at 24. 
 213. See National Conference of State Legislatures, 2004 Legislation Regulating or 
Prohibiting Non-U.S. Citizens from State Contracts, June 29, 2004, available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/standcomm/scecon/04LegisECON.htm. 
 214. See K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 381 A.2d 
774, 789 (1977) (upholding constitutionality of state “Buy American” law on the grounds that it did 
not “impermissibly interfere with the federal government’s conduct of foreign affairs” or impose 
judgment on any foreign state); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 
229 (1969) (invalidating state “Buy American” law as conflicting with federal trade policies). 
 215. San Francisco, Cleveland, and a number of other cities have laws banning the 
procurement of products made in sweatshops. See, Pittsburgh Joins City Fight Against Sweatshops, 
U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 23, 1997 (discussing Pittsburgh sweatshop ordinance); Linda Himelstein, 
Going Beyond City Limits? Municipalities Are Exercising Their Clout on Social Issues - And 
Business Is Balking, BUS. WK., July 7, 1997, at 98 (noting passage of San Francisco ordinance). 
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special observer status at the U.N.216  These recommendations are based 
on the assumption that localities have a unique perspective about and 
role in governing that needs to be protected and promoted at an 
international level. 
With the pervasive effects of globalization, many localities’ actions 
that protect and promote domestic markets and values have an incidental 
effect on foreign relations.  Sometimes these cases also have 
protectionist or xenophobic undertones, but in all of them traditional 
state and local interests are also being pursued. 
Such incidental effects have been challenged in U.S. court cases.  
For example, in 2004 in the complaint to Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 
Inc. et al. v. Witherspoon217 several major automakers including Ford 
and General Motors sued the California Air Resources Board.  They 
argued that the Clean Air Act and federal fuel economy laws preempted 
the California’s regulation of carbon dioxide.  They also claimed, 
however, that the federal foreign affairs power and the dormant foreign 
interstate commerce clause preempted the state regulations.  The 
petitioner’s brief submitted that California’s regulation of carbon dioxide 
“. . . interferes with the U.S. speaking with one voice on matters of 
global climate change, and it diminishes the President’s leverage in 
negotiating multilateral commitments to reduce greenhouse gases.”218 
Local regulations that have an incidental impact on foreign 
commerce have also been challenged under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA.  
In December 2003, Glamis Gold Ltd, a Canadian mining company, filed 
a complaint under Chapter Eleven challenging state regulations that 
blocked their development of a California mine site.219  The regulations 
 
 216. United Cities and Local Governments, Stronger partnership with local governments 
central to reforming the UN, available at http://www.cities-
localgovernments.org/uclg/index.asp?pag=template.asp&L=EN&ID=282 (last visited Dec. 27, 
2006). 
 217. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Central Valley Chrysler-
Jeep, Inc., et. al. v. Witherspoon, Case No. 1:04-cv-06663-REC-LJO (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2005). 
 218. Id. at 95. The Brief continues: 
The President’s bargaining power is reduced even further if other states adopt 
California’s fuel economy standards.  Far from attempting to conform their actions to the 
position of the national government, California officials, including the Secretary of the 
California Environmental Protection Agency and CARB officials beneath him, are 
actively campaigning for adoption of CARB’s regulation by at least one foreign 
government (Canada), to make federal fuel economy policy irrelevant or much less 
important in the global automobile industry. 
Id. 
 219. Glamis Gold, LTD., Notice of Arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade and the North American Free Trade Agreement: 
Glamis Gold Ltd.,Claimant/Investor, and The Government of the United States of America, 
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required backfilling the mine site, which would make the project 
financially infeasible.220  The regulations had general applicability, but 
were implemented because of specific concerns about environmental and 
cultural damage that the Glamis Gold mine site might cause.221  The 
arbitration is ongoing. 
In 2005 in Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, a Chapter 
Eleven Tribunal rejected the claim of a Canadian company that a 
California Executive Order banning the use of the gasoline additive 
MTBE, which the company manufactured, violated NAFTA.222  It 
ordered the company to pay the costs of litigation for the United 
States.223 
In March 2004, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., a 
Canadian company in the tobacco industry operating in the United 
States, lodged a complaint under Chapter Eleven.224  Under an 
agreement between the major cigarette makers and forty-six states, the 
states agreed to not pursue litigation against tobacco companies in 
exchange for a multi-billion dollar settlement.225  The tobacco 
companies had to raise prices to fund the settlement.226  They feared, 
however, that smaller companies who had not been sued, and so were 
not part of the settlement, would thereby gain an unfair market 
advantage.227  In response, the states established a series of incentives to 
attract non-party tobacco companies to join the agreement as well as 
imposed additional regulations if they did not join the agreement.228  
Grand River Enterprises Six Nations challenged these state acts under 
NAFTA.229  The litigation is ongoing.230 
 
Respondent/Party, Dec. 9, 2003, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/27320.pdf. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. U.S. Dept. of State, Methanex v. United States of America Summary, available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c5818.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2006) (the claimed violations were under 
Article 1110 (a claim of expropriation), Article 1105 (denying fair and equitable treatment in 
accordance with international law), and Article 1102 (discriminatory treatment against foreign 
investors)). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Grand River, et al., Notice of Arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law and The North American Free Trade Agreement: 
Between Grand River Enterprises Six nations, Ltd., et al. and the Government of the United States, 
Mar. 10, 2004, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/30961.pdf. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
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The WTO has also been a site of international debate around state 
and local policies that affect foreign commerce.  In 2005, the WTO 
Appellate Body found that U.S. federal cotton subsidies violated 
provisions of GATT and the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM).231  State and local subsidies have also 
come under scrutiny though.  In a trade dispute between the European 
Union and the United States over their respective support of Airbus and 
Boeing, each brought a complaint against the other in the WTO over 
government subsidies.232  In its original complaint, filed in October 
2004, the European Union claimed that the United States was not in 
compliance with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures as well as provisions of GATT.  The complaint not only 
argued that different forms of federal subsidies violated these 
agreements, but also argued that tax and incentive packages given by 
Kansas, Washington State, and the city of Chicago violated these 
agreements.233  According to the EU, the Washington state package to 
Boeing was worth $7 billion.234  There is currently a WTO panel 
reviewing these complaints.235  Localities have long given subsidies to 
attract corporations, rejuvenate depressed communities, and retain 
businesses that are part of their cultural heritage.  Such subsidies are 
likely to come under increasing scrutiny from the WTO. 
The unsuccessful implementation or inadequacy of state or local 
laws and regulations can also have an impact on commerce with foreign 
countries.  For example, states are responsible for the tracking of 
animals and any diseases they might have.  In 2004, an outbreak of mad 
cow disease in Washington cost the U.S. $400 million in lost sales to 
Japan alone.236  In this way, the effectiveness of one state’s regulation of 
 
 230. U.S. Dept. of State, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et. al. v. United States of 
America Summary, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c11935.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2006). 
 231. WTO, Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS267, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 
2006). 
 232. BBC, U.S. takes Airbus dispute to WTO, BBC NEWS, Oct. 6, 2004, available at  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3720710.stm. 
 233. United States - Measures Affecting Trade In Large Civil Aircraft: Request for 
Consultations by the European Communities, G/SCM/D63/1, Oct. 12, 2004. 
 234. European Union News Releases, EU Resumes WTO Case Against Boeing, May 31, 2005, 
available at http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2005/2005056.htm. 
 235. WTO, Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS317, United States - Measures Affecting Trade In 
Large Civil Aircraft, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds317_e.htm 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2006). 
 236. Gene Rose, State Legislatures’ Top 10: Here’s a Sample of the Key Policy Issues that 
Promise to Cross State Borders and Test Political Wills, STATE LEGISLATURES, Jan. 2005, at 10. 
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animal disease can affect the ability of all states to access international 
markets for their animal products.  This may add fuel to the argument to 
federalize such regulations. 
Localities’ laws also affirm local values that may be contrary to the 
values of other countries.  The “culture wars” that take place between 
different constituencies in the United States are often joined by foreign 
voices who feel that certain policies offend universal rights, values, or 
sensibilities.  For example, until the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper 
v. Simmons, twenty states continued to allow for the execution of 
juveniles despite near universal international condemnation of juvenile 
executions.237  Opposition to the death penalty in general is widespread 
in much of the world, and the continued widespread use of the death 
penalty in the United States has at times become a diplomatic strain, 
especially with countries in Europe.  The European Union maintains an 
official website detailing EU member state action on the U.S. death 
penalty.  European Union members angered by executions taking place 
in the United States have written numerous open letters to state 
governors, declarations of condemnation, and amicus briefs.238  As 
already noted, the ICJ in Avena held that 54 Mexican nationals on state 
death rows had their consular rights violated under the Vienna 
Convention for Consular Relations.239 
Gay marriage and civil unions provide another sight for potential 
conflicts of values on the international stage.  Most states have laws 
which prohibit marriage between same-sex couples, and many have 
passed constitutional amendments barring same-sex marriage.240  
Vermont, Connecticut, and New Jersey allow civil unions between 
same-sex couples.241  In 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled 
that outlawing same-sex marriages was unconstitutional under the 
Massachusetts constitution.242  Canada, Spain, the Netherlands, and 
 
 237. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). 
 238. See generally, European Union, EU & Action on the Death Penalty (section on “Action 
on US Death Row Cases”) available at, 
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/deathpenhome.htm#ActiononUSDeathRowCases 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2006). 
 239. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. Unites States of 
America), 43 I.L.M. 581 (2004). 
 240. See Lambda Legal, Background: State Laws and Proposed Amendments to State 
Constitutions to Deny Civil Rights to Same-Sex Couples, available at 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/fact.html?record=1530 (last visited Dec. 28, 2006). 
 241. Gay Marriage Around the Globe, BBC NEWS, Dec. 22, 2005, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4081999.stm [hereinafter Gay Marriage]. 
 242. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003). 
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Belgium all have nation-wide same-sex marriage.243  Canada allows 
same-sex foreign nationals to marry.244  Several other countries such as 
Denmark and Germany offer similar although not always equal benefits 
to same-sex couples as married couples (i.e. civil unions).245  
Recognition of same-sex marriages and civil unions consummated 
abroad is done on a state by state basis in the United States.  States in the 
U.S. that do not recognize same-sex marriage or civil unions may upset 
countries that allow such unions if same-sex couples from their country 
seek temporary residency in these states and want their marriages or 
civil unions recognized.  Similarly, a same-sex couple from Vermont 
who is in a civil union may ask Vermont to advocate that their union be 
recognized in another country in which they are temporarily residing that 
does not currently recognize same-sex unions. 
Differing views about what constitutes human life also may embroil 
states in a global debate about values.  In November 2004, in reaction to 
federal limitations on National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding for 
certain types of stem-cell research, California voters passed a $3 billion 
initiative to finance stem-cell research.246  This makes California’s stem-
cell research budget on par with countries such as Sweden and 
Singapore which have made such research a priority.247  Several other 
states have either budgeted money or proposed money for stem-cell 
research as well.248  Meanwhile, Arkansas, Iowa, Michigan, North 
Dakota, and South Dakota all prohibit cloning of embryos for the 
purpose of research or reproduction.249  The issues surrounding cloning 
and stem-cell research all have the potential to insult the moral 
sensibilities of the citizens and governments of foreign countries and 
become diplomatic issues in the future. 
States’ differing stances on illegal immigrants directly affect 
relations with foreign citizens and their countries.  States have taken 
different positions on whether illegal immigrants will be eligible for 
non-emergency health care, certain labor rights, in-state college tuition 
rates, legal services, voting, identification cards, and other public 
benefits.  Some states have also specifically trained state officials to 
 
 243. Gay Marriage, supra note 247. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Silla Brush, The Stem Cell Race, STATE LEGISLATURES, Apr. 2005, at 24-25. 
 247. Id. 
 248. New Jersey has approved money for stem cell research.  New York, Illinois, Wisconsin, 
Maryland, and Connecticut all have proposed legislation that proposes money for stem cell research. 
Id. at 26. 
 249. Id. 
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arrest illegal immigrants.  In others, state officials make no coordinated 
effort to track or arrest illegal immigrants.250  Such actions and anti-
immigrant sentiment fueled by local politicians can offend foreign 
governments and complicate U.S. foreign relations. 
Even something as seemingly innocuous as the choice of a textbook 
by a school board can have far reaching international implications.  In 
April of 2005, thousands of protesters marched in Chinese cities angered 
by the Japanese government’s approval of textbooks that were perceived 
by many in China as glossing over the atrocities Japan committed in 
China during World War II.251  Although this was a Japanese national 
government decision made in the context of deep historical animosity 
between the two nations, in the United States this decision would be 
made on the state and local level. 
The traditional domains of localities are becoming of greater 
international concern.  Many of these areas of regulation are at the heart 
of state and local governance.  Local decisions in these areas allow 
citizens to more fully shape their lives, create a nation-wide system of 
policy experimentation, and provide a check on federal and international 
power.  The internationalization of trade, human rights, and 
environmental commitments means, however, that many of these core 
functions of localities are coming under new scrutiny and threat.  These 
state and local policies could be struck down by U.S. courts under the 
dormant foreign relations clause, heightened legislative or executive 
preemption (depending on what steps the executive or legislative 
branches have taken to occupy the field), or even the dormant foreign 
commerce clause.  Such judicial intervention could severely and, quite 
possibly, unnecessarily constrain the ability of localities to express core 
values in the name of a united “one voice” in foreign policy. 
3. Laws and actions that judge other countries’ behavior 
Localities’ actions that judge other countries’ behavior could be 
defined as a sub-category of protecting or promoting localities’ values 
(category two).  These actions, however, are dealt with in a separate 
category here because these judgments are targeted at particular policies 
 
 250. Mark Mathews, Immigration Bedevils Lawmakers, STATELINE, Sept. 2, 2005, available at 
http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&contentId=51980; 
National Conference of State Legislatures, 2006 State Legislation Related to Immigration: Enacted, 
Vetoed, and Pending Gubernatorial Action, June 7, 2006, available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/06ImmigEnactedLegis.htm. 
 251. BBC, China Rejects Call for an Apology, BBC NEWS, Apr. 17, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4453055.stm. 
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of specific countries.  They have also garnered special judicial scrutiny. 
Localities may judge other countries’ behavior explicitly through 
resolutions or legislation.  States may also delegate that judgment to the 
state executive or judiciary.  These judgments of foreign countries can 
sometimes be just rhetorical expressions in the case of state resolutions, 
have real economic or judicial force behind them as in the case of 
divestment campaigns or lawsuits, or be symbolic such as when cities 
have used their sister-city ties to pursue human rights objectives.252  
These judgments may be purely expressive, an ethical attempt to ensure 
state resources are not complicit in the judged behavior, or an attempt to 
influence behavior by other countries. 
State legislatures have used resolutions as a way to condemn the 
actions of other countries on such diverse issues as Apartheid in South 
Africa, genocide in Sudan,253 or the arrest and show trials of Jews in 
Iran.254  These resolutions may bring media attention to a specific issue 
and are circulated to the state’s congressional delegation.  They also 
provide tangible goals for local constituencies to work towards, which 
helps build momentum for broader movements.  Although these state 
resolutions may undermine the U.S.’s one voice in foreign relations, 
they are likely protected by the First Amendment.255 
States have also used their economic power to condemn human 
rights abuses overseas.  The South African divestment campaign spread 
during the 1980s as many localities felt Reagan’s policy of “constructive 
engagement” and “quiet diplomacy” towards South Africa was not a 
forceful enough response to apartheid.256  During the South Africa 
divestment campaign, 37 states adopted some form of sanctions against 
the government of South Africa.257  These sanctions usually involved 
 
 252. FRY, supra note 201, at 84 (discussing efforts by various U.S. cities to promote 
international human rights); HOBBS, supra note 203, at 6 (noting that Mayor Dinkins of New York 
City traveled to South Africa during Apartheid to express his support for continued sanctions). 
 253. See Assem. Res. 209, 211th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2004); H. J. Res. 56, 94th Gen. Assem., 
Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005); H. Con. Res. 143, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005); S. 608, 116th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (S.C. 2005); H. Con. Res. 143, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005); S. Res. 112, 2005 Leg., Reg. 
Sess., (Haw. 2005); S. Con. Res. 205, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess.,  (Haw. 2004). 
 254. Assem. J. Res. 64, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess., (Cal. 2000). 
 255. However, the precedent here is not clear.  Individual state legislators certainly enjoy full, 
if not heightened, first amendment protection (see Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966)), but a state 
assembly could potentially be enjoined from passing a resolution that disrupted the U.S.’s ability to 
conduct foreign relations.  The Court in Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 13341, remarks in dicta that Garamendi and Zschernig do not seem to prohibit state 
resolutions which contradicts U.S. foreign policy. Id. at 38.  However, the Court is only speaking in 
dicta and this statement is not otherwise substantiated. 
 256. HOBBS, supra note 203, at 29. 
 257. See PETER DESIMONE & WILLIAM F. MOSES, A GUIDE TO AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL 
52
Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 4, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss4/3
ROBINSONFINAL.DOC 5/14/2007  12:48:46 PM 
2007] CITIZENS NOT SUBJECTS 699 
different restrictions on the ability of the state pension plan to invest in 
companies that did business in South Africa.  Additionally, at least 105 
cities and 32 counties maintained some type of restriction on their 
banking, investment, and procurement practices with South Africa.258 
In 1996, Massachusetts adopted an act that restricted the state’s 
procurement of goods or services from companies that did business in 
Burma.259  Apple Computer along with other companies reportedly 
terminated their Burma operations in response to the Massachusetts 
Burma statute.260  In 2000, in Crosby the Supreme Court ruled that this 
selective purchasing law was preempted by federal legislation that 
created a national sanctions regime towards Burma.261  Since Crosby 
there has been debate about how articulated a national policy must be 
toward another country before it preempts state action toward that 
country.  Further, it is unclear what types of state action besides selective 
procurement policies could be preempted.262 
Despite the ambiguity surrounding Crosby, cities and states 
continue to use their clout as investors to express their scorn for the 
policies of certain governments as well as attempt to promote their view 
of a more just world.  For example, the MacBride Principles provide a 
corporate code of conduct for doing business in Northern Ireland for 
multinationals to ensure nondiscrimination on the basis of religion.263  At 
least 16 states have passed MacBride Principles legislation that directs 
their pension funds to only invest in companies in compliance with these 
principles if they are active in Northern Ireland.264 
Other restrictions on pension funds exist as well.  Connecticut, for 
example, restricts its pension fund from investing in companies that are 
 
LAWS ON SOUTH AFRICA 19-43 (1993). 
 258. Id. at 1, 47-138 (city ordinances), 141-63 (county ordinances). 
 259. 1996 Mass. Acts 239, ch. 130 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7 § 22G-M, 
40F.5(1997)) (cited in Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 367 (2000).). 
 260. See Frank Phillips, Apple Cites Mass. Law in Burma Decision, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 
1996, at B6 (stating “company would end its operations in Burma because of the Massachusetts 
law”); See also, Crosby, 530 U.S. at 370 (noting that three plaintiff member companies had 
withdrawn from Burma after passage of Massachusetts law). 
 261. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388. 
 262. Andrea Sendlenski, Note: Taking Our Money and Going Home: State Divestment Policy 
and the Foreign Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Supremacy Clauses, 24 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. 
REV. 317 (2001) (arguing state divestment statutes with the intent to effect foreign affairs violate the 
Foreign Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Supremacy Clauses) 
 263. Father Sean McManus, The Macbride Principles, Dec. 1997, available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/macbride.html. 
 264. Id.  These states include Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Texas, and Vermont. Id. 
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doing business in Iran in a manner that is contrary to U.S. foreign policy 
interests there.265  The State of Arizona requires its state treasurer to 
report twice a year on the global security risks of state investments.266  
This report must include a list of companies held in the treasurer’s 
portfolio who have business activities in countries that the federal 
government has listed as supporting terrorism.267  Vermont requires its 
treasurer to cast proxy votes in the companies it holds stock in to 
promote human rights and transparency in relation to Burma.268  Other 
state and local governments have adopted human-rights based sanctions 
against Indonesia, Nigeria, Cuba, and countries engaging in religious 
persecution.269 
In 2004, the New York State Senate blocked the UN’s proposed 
renovation of its New York City headquarters.270  Various Senators cited 
the oil for food scandal, anti-Semitism in the organization, and the 
nonpayment of parking tickets by visiting diplomats as part of their 
reasons for blocking the proposed renovation.271  In this case, it was not 
a specific country, but a specific international organization that was 
targeted for a state’s scorn. 
In some states, judgment of other countries’ behavior or policies is 
delegated to officials of the state executive.  In California, for example, 
the State Treasurer evaluates the political stability in emerging equity 
markets using such factors as the country’s human rights and civil 
liberties record before it invests CALPERS, the largest state pension 
fund in the country.272  The treasurer lists which emerging markets it will 
invest in each year.  This list of the $168 billion pension plan does not 
go unnoticed by investors or government officials abroad.273  In 
 
 265. STATE OF CONNECTICUT RETIREMENT PLANS & TRUST FUNDS, INVESTMENT POLICY 
STATEMENT, Mar. 13, 2002, at 21, available at http://www.state.ct.us/ott/pensiondocs/IPS.pdf. 
 266. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-319 (2007). 
 267. Id. 
 268. H.B. 34, 65th Leg., Biennel Sess., (Vt. 1999). 
 269. Organization for International Investment, Current Issues, 
http://www.ofii.org/issues/sanction.cfm (last visited Dec. 28, 2006) (listing state and municipal 
sanctions from the 1990’s); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.471 (West 2001) (restricting the investment of 
Florida’s funds in Cuba). 
 270. Press Release, News From the Senate Republican Majority, Senate Will Not Take Up 
United Nations Bill Next Week (Dec. 2, 2004), 
http://www.senate.state.ny.us/pressreleases.nsf/2e0e86fa9105ed5a85256ec30061c0be/109e9077be7
1eb7985256f5e006c703b?OpenDocument. 
 271. Id. 
 272. CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, STATEMENT OF INVESTMENT 
POLICY FOR PERMISSIBLE EQUITY FOR EMERGING EQUITY MARKETS, Oct. 17, 2005, at 2, available 
at https://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/investments/policies/equity/permissible-country.pdf. 
 273. See Nuntawun Polkuamdee, Thailand back in US fund’s good books, BANGKOK POST, 
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Connecticut, the state treasurer is directed to consider environmental and 
social implications of its investments, which inevitably involves at least 
implicitly judging the social situations in other countries.274  State 
Treasurers in California, New York, and Connecticut have also worked 
to address companies’ contributions to sweatshop labor and global 
warming.275  These actions often attempt to regulate companies’ 
behavior abroad because the countries in which they are doing business 
are unable or unwilling to do so themselves. 
In 2005, Illinois, New Jersey, and Oregon all passed legislation to 
divest their pension plans from companies because of their business in 
Sudan, where there are ongoing atrocities being committed in Darfur.276  
As of April 2007, seven more states had joined these three in passing 
divestment legislation.277  Several cities and counties have also divested 
their funds from companies that do business in Sudan.278 
In August of 2006, the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) and 
several municipal pension funds in Illinois brought suit against the 
Illinois Act to End Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan [the Illinois 
Sudan Act].279  The Illinois Sudan Act amended the Deposit of State 
Moneys Act to bar the state from depositing state funds in a financial 
institution unless it annually certifies that it does not borrow money to a 
“forbidden entity” (i.e. almost any company that does business in or with 
Sudan).  The Illinois Sudan Act also prevented any pension fund created 
under the Illinois Pension Code (which includes many municipal 
pension funds) from investing in a “forbidden entity.”280  The Act’s 
definition of forbidden entity was one of the broadest of any of the 
states’ Sudan divestment legislation.  Further, the Illinois Sudan Act 
 
Apr. 20, 2005. 
 274. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-13d (West 2006). 
 275. Tracy Rembert, CSR in the Cross-Hairs, BUSINESS ETHICS ONLINE, Spring 2005, 
available at http://www.business-ethics.com/current_issue/spring_2005_csr_crosshairs.html. 
 276. S.B. 23. 94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005); S.B. 2145, 211 Leg., Second Sess. (N.J. 
2004); S.B. 1089, 73rd Leg., Reg. Sess., (Or. 2005). 
 277. See Assem. B. 2941, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess., (Cal. 2006), H.B. 5632, 2006 Leg., Feb. 
Sess., (Conn. 2006); S. Paper 675,122nd Leg., Reg. Sess., (Me. 2005) See generally, Sudan 
Divestment Taskforce,  http://www.sudandivestment.org/home.asp (last visited May 5, 2007). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Elizabeth Kelleher, U.S. Trade Group Files Suit over Illinois Sanctions on Sudan, U.S. 
Dept. of State News from Washington, Aug. 7 2006, available at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-
english&y=2006&m=August&x=20060807174000berehellek0.6285974; Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief, Nat’l Foreign Trade Counsel v. Giannoulias, No. 06C4251 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 
2006), available at 
http://www.nftc.org/default/sudan%20lawsuit/NFCT%20v.%20Topinka%20complaint.pdf. 
 280. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13341, at 3-9. 
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went beyond most divestment legislation in barring the state from 
depositing money in financial institutions that gave loans to Sudan-
involved companies. 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois enjoined 
enforcement of the Illinois Sudan Act in a February 2007 decision.  It 
found unconstitutional both the amendments to the Deposit to the States 
Money Act and the Illinois Pension Code.281  The District Court’s 
reasoning though could potentially be used to uphold other states’ 
divestment legislation, or a revised Illinois statute. 
The District Court first asked if the Illinois Sudan Act was barred 
by the Supremacy Clause.  The Court found that U.S. relations with 
Sudan were governed by a 1997 Executive Order, the 2000 Trade 
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act, the 2002 Sudan Peace 
Act, the 2004 Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, and the 2006 Darfur 
Peace and Accountability Act.282  Citing Hines v. Davidowitz, Zschernig, 
and a first circuit opinion, the Court argued that when the U.S. 
government acts in an area of foreign relations there is a strong 
presumption it intends to occupy the field.  The District Court found that 
the Illinois Sudan Act’s amendment of the Deposit of State Moneys Act, 
like the Massachusetts’ legislation at issue in Crosby, “attempt[s] to 
influence foreign policy directly by encouraging business entities not to 
do business with a foreign country; if the entities decide not to do so, 
they lose their ability to do business with the state.”283  This amendment 
is in conflict with U.S. foreign policy because the Illinois Sudan Act 
lacks flexibility (the president cannot suspend the Illinois legislation in 
the national interest); it applies to areas of Sudan not covered under 
federal sanctions (i.e. Southern Sudan); and it extends to foreign entities 
while the federal legislation only regulates U.S. entities.284 
Therefore, the District Court held the amendments to the Deposit of 
State Moneys Act violated the supremacy clause because it pressured 
banks and corporations to cut ties with Sudan and, thereby, came in 
conflict with U.S. policy towards Sudan.  The amendments to the 
Pension code did not violate the Supremacy Clause though because no 
evidence was presented that suggested pensions’ divestment from 
companies that do business in Sudan would likely affect whether these 
companies decided to stay in Sudan.285  In other words, the Court said 
 
 281. Giannoulias, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
 282. Id. at 9-14. 
 283. Id. at 27. 
 284. Id. at 28-30. 
 285. Id. at 30-31. 
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that pressuring banks to limit who they lent to will likely have an effect 
on banks and corporations so this action is preempted by federal policy, 
but since divestment will likely have little effect it is not preempted. 
The Court followed a similar reasoning when examining whether 
the Illinois Sudan Act was barred by the Foreign Affairs Power.  Citing 
Zschernig and Garamendi, the District Court held that the amendments 
to the Deposit of State Moneys Act violated the Foreign Affairs Power 
because it applied immediate pressure on banks and corporations to 
leave Sudan.  Such action had more than “an incidental or indirect effect 
in foreign countries.”286 In contrast, the evidence divestment would have 
an effect on companies’ behavior, and thus foreign policy, was only 
speculative.  As a result, the Court found that the amendments to the 
Pension code withstood scrutiny by the Foreign Affairs Power.287 
Finally, the District Court examined whether the Illinois Sudan Act 
violated the Foreign Commerce Clause.  It found that both components 
of the Illinois Sudan Act effected foreign commerce since the purpose of 
the act was to limit trade with Sudan.288  The Court noted that it was 
unclear if there was a market-participant exception for states under the 
foreign commerce clause as there is under the ordinary commerce 
clause.289  This question, however, was not reached.  The amendments to 
the Deposit of State Moneys Act had already been found to violate the 
Supremacy Clause and Foreign Affairs Power.  The amendments to the 
Pension code could not qualify for the market-participant exception 
because the Pension code covered both state and municipal pensions.  
The state could only potentially act as a market participant when it 
regulated its own pension funds.  However, when it regulated municipal 
pension funds – which are administered and contributed to locally – it 
was acting as a regulator and not a market-participant.  Since the 
language of the Illinois Sudan Act did not distinguish between its 
regulation of state and municipal pensions the Court could not just strike 
out the offending language that regulates municipal pensions.290  Instead, 
the District Court found the whole provision barred by the Foreign 
Commerce Clause. 
The District Court’s opinion suggests that state divestment 
legislation, like that in Illinois, would be constitutional if it does not 
 
 286. Id. at 40, quoting Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 52 (1st Cir. 1999), 
citing Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947)). 
 287. Giannoulias, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 43-44. 
 288. Id. at 46-47. 
 289. Id. at 50-51. 
 290. Id. at 53-56. 
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mandate that governmental sub-units also divest.  Of course, a future 
court would still need to determine whether a state was acting as a 
market participant when it divests. 
The Illinois District Court’s line of reasoning leaves the 
constitutionality of divestment on unstable ground.  This is particularly 
problematic since NFTC has announced it may challenge other state 
divestment laws and any revised Illinois Sudan Act.291  Why does 
barring a state from investing its money in a bank that makes loans to 
companies that do business in Sudan have more impact than divesting 
state funds from companies that do business in Sudan?  Divestment 
often involves larger amounts of money.  Both actions bring bad 
publicity to companies who are invested in Sudan applying pressure on 
them to leave.  If companies did start leaving Sudan because of states 
divesting would this then mean divestment had an impact on foreign 
affairs and so would be struck down?  Divestment would then only be 
held unconstitutional if it was successful at achieving its goal. 
The Illinois Sudan Act required the state to divest from many 
companies and financial institutions with only an incidental relation to 
Sudan.  By casting such a wide net, the Illinois legislation may have 
unnecessarily risked the financial health of Illinois pension plans.  The 
answer to this problem, however, is not for courts to dictate to states that 
they cannot control whether their money is invested in companies that 
support genocidal regimes.  Instead, if this legislation is overly broad, a 
legislative remedy is more appropriate.  Legislators do not want to 
unnecessarily jeopardize the returns of the state pension plans.  If Illinois 
does not amend their divestment legislation, it may be because the state 
genuinely wishes to divest from companies that have any relation to 
Sudan, even if this relation is more incidental than direct. 
Although the Illinois divestment legislation may seem heavy-
handed, the Sudan divestment strategies of other localities have been 
remarkably savvy.  With the aid of the Internet, localities and groups that 
have mobilized around divestment can relatively quickly identify many 
of the companies who are most active in supporting the government of 
Sudan.292  Localities can then direct their fund managers to divest from 
 
 291. Kelleher, supra note 285; Foreign trade group against Sudan legislation, PENSIONS & 
INVESTMENTS, April 9, 2007, available at  
http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070409/DAILY/70409005. 
 292. See generally, Sudan Divestment Taskforce, supra note 278; ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, AN ANALYSIS OF SELECT COMPANIES’ OPERATIONS IN 
SUDAN: A RESOURCE FOR DIVESTMENT (2005), available at 
http://acir.yale.edu/YaleLowensteinSudanReport.pdf. 
58
Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 4, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss4/3
ROBINSONFINAL.DOC 5/14/2007  12:48:46 PM 
2007] CITIZENS NOT SUBJECTS 705 
these companies. 
Like in Crosby, Congress has not expressly acted to affirm the 
Illinois state divestment legislation just as it did not expressly act to 
affirm Massachusetts’s procurement policy.  In both cases, Congress, 
however, passed later stages of its sanctions regime, knowing of the state 
actions and did not expressly preempt such activity. 
The House version of the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act 
contained a provision affirming the legality of state divestment 
legislation.293  This provision, however, was later taken out of the Senate 
version in committee.294  The revised version was passed in September 
of 2006.295  Meanwhile, SB 831 was introduced in the Senate in March 
2007.  This bill would declare that it is the sense of Congress that 
divestment by states and other governmental entities is constitutional 
and does not violate the Supremacy Clause, the Foreign Affairs Power, 
or the Foreign Commerce Clause.296  Although Congress has not yet 
explicitly endorsed the legality of localities’ divestment action, it is 
clearly aware of localities’ divestment activity and has not explicitly 
preempted it. 
It should not be the role of the courts to interfere with the foreign 
policy of localities and the federal government when no explicit conflict 
has arisen between these policies.  As of May 2007, there were eight co-
sponsors of SB 831.297  Does this mean Congress supports localities’ 
divestment?  What of the Senate’s removal of the provision of the Darfur 
Peace and Accountability Act that would have affirmed the legality of 
divestment legislation?  Courts would be engaging in a guessing game at 
this point if they were to strike down the Illinois divestment legislation 
claiming it interfered with the country’s foreign policy.  This is 
dangerous to America’s foreign policy and unnecessarily undermines the 
democracy and federalism interests of localities and the citizens they 
represent.  If actions, like divestment, require federal affirmation before 
they are considered constitutional, the states will rarely act on foreign 
policy issues.  Congress is unlikely to affirm state action like divestment 
until several states have divested, but most states are unlikely to divest if 
that action is considered unconstitutional until federal approval is given. 
 
 293. DarfurScores.org, Darfur Legislation, http://www.darfurscores.org/darfur-
legislation#hr6140 (last visited Dec. 30, 2006). 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. S. 831, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 297. S. 831: Sudan divestment Authorization Act of 2007, GOVTRACK.US, available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-831 (accessed May 6, 2007). 
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The state judicial system also either explicitly or implicitly judges 
foreign countries.  For example, in Zschernig the state of Oregon 
allowed property to escheat to a foreigner only if the foreigner’s country 
gave a reciprocal right to Americans.298  Both the actual legislation and 
the judicial opinions allowed for a judgment of Communist countries.299  
This was found to be too controversial during the Cold War by the 
Supreme Court and was struck down.300 
In John Doe, et. al. v. Unocal Corp., the Superior Court of 
California ruled that Unocal, a California based oil and gas company, 
could be tried for its involvement in abuses against Burmese villagers 
during its construction of a pipeline in that country.301  Under pressure 
from the upcoming state trial and a possible unfavorable decision by an 
en banc 9th Circuit decision in an ATCA case being heard on the same 
set of facts, Unocal settled with the Burmese villagers.302  The decision 
by the state court that Burma was not an adequate forum for the suit was 
a judgment of the competency and independence of Burmese courts.  
The trial of the claims against Unocal would have not only judged the 
company’s actions, but implicitly judged the actions of the Burmese 
government as well (as many of the abuses were committed by Burmese 
military hired by Unocal as security).303 
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004), the Supreme 
Court found that claims could be made by foreign citizens in U.S. courts 
for private claims under federal common law, but they cannot be claims 
“for violations of any international norm with less definite content and 
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms 
familiar when 1350 [the ATCA] was enacted.”304  Alvarez may be read 
to create a federal common law that preempts state common law claims 
 
 298. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S 429, 430 n.1 (1968). 
 299. Id. at 440. 
 300. Id. at 435. 
 301. 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2001).  The original complaint made claims of wrongful death, 
battery, false imprisonment, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, negligence per se, conversion, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, 
violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200, injunctive and declaratory relief, 
violation of California Constitution Art. 1 Sec. 6 [outlawing slavery], and unjust enrichment.  Id. at 
943-44.  Defendants eventually received summary judgment on the intentional tort and negligence 
causes of action as to direct liability, but were to go to trial on issues of vicarious liability.  Id. 
 302. EarthRights International, Final Settlement Reached in Doe v. Unocal, Mar. 21, 2005, 
http://www.earthrights.org/legalfeature/final_settlement_reached_in_doe_v._unocal.html; 
EarthRights International, Doe v. Unocal Case History, Jan. 30, 2006, 
http://www.earthrights.org/site_blurbs/doe_v._unocal_case_history.html. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). 
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that involve abuses in foreign countries such as in the state Unocal case.  
It is unclear what role state courts will have in the future of hearing 
claims concerning human rights abuses abroad since state courts do not 
have the same standards for hearing these cases as federal courts do 
under the ATCA. 
4. Laws and actions that influence the nation’s foreign policy 
Localities’ actions often attempt to influence national foreign 
policy.  Some of these actions merely help reinforce and support 
preexisting federal foreign policy.  The most prominent example of this 
is localities’ support of the U.S. military in their operations abroad.305 
However, localities’ actions may also be in protest to U.S. foreign 
policy or designed to change it.  The Central American sanctuary 
movement grew out of dissatisfaction with the U.S.’s policy towards 
Central America in the 1980’s and the belief that refugees from El 
Salvador and Guatemala were politically persecuted despite U.S. support 
for these regimes.  In all, “more than 20 cities and two states declared 
themselves sanctuaries for Central American refugees.”306  During this 
same period, 87 cities created sister city type relationships with 
communities in Nicaragua, in part to show solidarity against U.S. policy 
there.307 
U.S. sanctions on Cuba have similarly been a target of state and 
local action both on political and economic grounds.  The Illinois and 
Texas state legislatures have passed resolutions in support of normal 
relations between the U.S. and Cuba.308  Some cities in the United States 
have established “Sister City” type relations with Cuban cities to express 
their support for more normal relations between the United States and 
Cuba.309  After lobbying by agricultural interests, Illinois Governor Ryan 
 
 305. At least twenty-six state governors have made trips to Southwest Asia to meet with 
National Guard troops from their states as well as active duty military since military operations 
began in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Donna Miles, Governors Praise Troops Following Middle East 
Visit, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 19, 2006, available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2006/20060419_4868.html. States have also created specific 
benefits and exemptions to help support those in the military in their states while the conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq are ongoing.  For example, New York passed a “Patriot Plan” to help support 
active duty troops while there are active military operations in Iraq.  Press Release of Gov. George 
E. Pataki, Governor Visits Families of Deployed 105th Military Police Company (Mar. 24, 2003) 
available at  http://www.state.ny.us/governor/press/03/march24_03.htm. 
 306. HOBBS, supra note 203, at 36-37. 
 307. Id. at 34. 
 308. On First Reading Some States Want to Open Cuba’s Closed Doors, STATE 
LEGISLATURES, Dec. 2001. 
 309. These cities include Mobile, Pittsburgh, and Milwaukee. The Center for International 
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led a mission to Cuba in 1999 to promote trade and deliver aid.310  
During the trip he met with Cuban President Fidel Castro.311  Shortly 
after returning he stated, “My hope is there will be other state 
delegations that go, and hopefully we’ll lift this embargo.”312  In 2002, 
Havana hosted governors and other representatives from seven states at a 
Food and Agribusiness Exhibition.313 
Over one hundred cities passed resolutions calling for the end of the 
Iraq War.314  In early 2005 during the annual town hall day in Vermont, 
49 cities and towns passed a resolution that asked the state legislature to 
investigate what the impact of National Guard deployments to Iraq are 
having on the state.315  Several cities across the country have passed 
resolutions calling on their states to withdraw their National Guard 
troops from Iraq.316  Dozens of local ballot initiatives in communities 
across the country called on the federal government to bring the troops 
home from Iraq in the November 2006 elections.317  State governors 
have also been openly critical of the U.S.’s involvement in the conflict in 
Iraq.318 
In March 2007, several towns in Vermont passed resolutions calling 
for the impeachment of President Bush and Vice President Cheney.  In 
April 2007, the Vermont State Senate in a non-binding resolution called 
on members of the U.S. House of Representatives to begin impeachment 
proceedings against the President and Vice President because of their 
actions in the United States and abroad, including Iraq.  These calls for 
 
Policy, State and Local Government Resolutions on Cuba, 
http://ciponline.org/cuba/trade/stateresmemo.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2007). 
 310. William Claiborne, Illinois Governor Defends Visit to Castro, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 
1999, at A2. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. After Ryan’s meeting with Castro, State Department spokesman James P. Rubin said 
that personal visits with Castro should be avoided “to not give the impression that anyone supports 
the oppression that he has visited on his people.”  Id. 
 313. Carolyn Orr, To Trade or Not to Trade?, STATE GOVERNMENT NEWS, Nov./Dec. 2002, at 
30, available at http://www.csg.org/pubs/Documents/sgn0212ToTradeOrNot.pdf. 
 314. Karen Dolan, Cities for Peace, TOMPAINE.COM, Nov. 10, 2006, 
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/11/10/cities_for_peace.php. 
 315. 57 of Vermont’s 251 cities and towns debated the proposal.  Katie Zezima, National 
Briefing: New England, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at 25; Pam Belluck, Vermonters Vote on Study 
of National Guard’s Role, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at 12. 
 316. See generally, Code Pink, States That Are Working to Bring Their Guard Home, 
http://www.codepinkalert.org/article.php?list=type&type=91 (last visited Apr. 18, 2007). 
 317. Wisconsin Network for Peace and Justice, State Referendum to Bring Our Troops Home, 
http://www.wnpj.org/homenow (last visited Apr. 18, 2007). 
 318. Michael Blood, Schwarzenegger Cites Iraq ‘Mistakes’, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2006 
(quoting Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger as stating that a lot mistakes were made by the U.S. in 
Iraq). 
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impeachment, which highlight a deep internal divide within the United 
States over its policy in Iraq, were reported upon by media around the 
world.319 
States and localities have pushed to change U.S. foreign policy 
more broadly as well.  For example, after the failure of SALT II during 
the Carter administration, the unwillingness of Reagan to support a 
nuclear test ban treaty, and the development of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative, citizens banded together to promote a freeze on the production 
of nuclear weapons in the 1980s.  Through town meetings, local 
referenda, resolutions, or other initiatives, more than 900 local 
governments acted on the freeze issue.320 
After the end of the Cold War, at least 70 mayors in the United 
States as well as hundreds of mayors from over 100 countries have 
signed a statement in support of a nuclear free world.321  State 
assemblies have similarly passed resolutions calling for the end of 
nuclear weapons.322  Some states have taken a different approach 
towards this national defense issue with at least 10 states having passed 
resolutions calling upon the national government to deploy a missile 
defense system since 1997.323 
States have also urged the United States to sign and ratify 
international agreements.  For example, several state governments have 
passed resolutions in support of the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).324 
Often state and local action arises out of dissatisfaction with the 
perceived inadequacy or incorrectness of a federal policy towards a 
foreign policy issue.  Catherine Powell calls the impact of state and local 
 
 319. Vermont state senate seeks to impeach Bush, Cheney, XINHUA, Apr. 21, 2007, available 
at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-04/21/content_6006599.htm (last visited May 3, 2007); 
Senators vote to impeach Bush, THE TIMES OF INDIA, Apr. 22, 2007, available at 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Europe/Vermont_senators_vote_to_impeach_Bush_Chene
y/articleshow/1936513.cms (last visited May 3, 2007). 
 320. HOBBS, supra note 203, at 21. 
 321. Abolition Now!, Mayors for Peace Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons, 
http://www.abolitionnow.org/site/c.lmK0JcNSJrF/b.1316337/k.9BB7/Mayors_for_Peace_Emergenc
y_Campaign_to_Ban_Nuclear_Weapons.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2007). 
 322. See S. J. Res. 33, Gen. Assem. (Conn. 2005), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/fc/2005SJ-00033-R000489-FC.htm. 
 323. See Missilethreat.com, State Resolutions Calling for Missile Defense, 
http://missilethreat.com/treaties/pageID.177/default.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2007). 
 324. Laura Roskos, International Law, National Sovereignty, and Local Norms: What’s to 
become of CEDAW in the U.S.?, THE BOSTON CONSORTIUM ON GENDER, SECURITY, AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS WORKING PAPER SERIES, Aug. 2003, at 32, available at 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/wappp/research/working/bc_roskos.pdf. 
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laws on national foreign policy “dialogic federalism.”325  She argues that 
enough local ordinances can create a norm cascade that affects federal 
policy.326  The U.S. federal sanctions against South Africa passed by 
Congress over President Reagan’s veto in 1986 were arguably in part a 
result of just such a norm cascade created by anti-apartheid resolutions 
and laws at the state and local level.327 
In many ways, it is the mobilization of citizens around, more than 
the passage of a resolution or act on a foreign policy issue that leads to a 
norm cascade which changes federal policy.  The effort required to 
convince legislators and their fellow citizens to support a locality’s 
official action gives citizens a tangible and reachable local goal to focus 
their efforts on.  This helps organize constituencies locally that can 
develop into a national coalition.  For example, someone who has 
worked continuously to garner support for a local divestment initiative 
on Sudan is also more likely to call their Congressperson to urge them to 
pass the Darfur Accountability Act. 
Norm cascades created by localities’ actions do not only impact the 
policy they are directed at, but have a wider impact as well.  For 
instance, the South Africa or Sudan divestment campaigns can be seen 
as national human rights moments.  These are moments in which a 
segment of the American public becomes unusually organized to 
promote a human rights-based foreign policy goal.  Most voters remain 
generally unaware of how U.S. foreign policy implicates human rights in 
other countries.  Further, most voters do not base their vote on foreign 
policy human rights issues.  The signal given by these human rights 
moments, however, creates an environment in which sympathetic 
legislators and policymakers can prioritize human rights concerns in 
other areas of foreign policy, knowing there is a constituency that 
generally supports this type of action. 
Local mobilization around human rights issues is not without its 
drawbacks though.  Local and state resolutions and laws may bring some 
attention to human rights problems in other parts of the world, but not in 
a timely manner.  The Rwandan genocide occurred in 100 days.  The 
South African divestment campaign began in the late 1970s and only 
built critical mass in the 1980s, decades after the creation of Apartheid.  
The genocide in Sudan began in early 2003.  The first resolution 
condemning the Sudanese government was in late 2004 after tens of 
 
 325. Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for the Incorporation 
of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 250 (2001). 
 326. Id. at 289. 
 327. HOBBS, supra note 203, at 30. 
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thousands had already died.  Although mobilization can happen 
increasingly quickly in a more interconnected world, any policy change 
that localities are able to bring about at the federal level will happen 
relatively slowly. 
Local actions might also unduly bias certain foreign policy 
initiatives.  Although the conflict in Sudan has inspired a large 
divestment campaign, the devastating civil war in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo at the turn of the twenty-first century inspired little 
action on the state and local level. 
Localities’ actions may also create the illusion of stronger support 
for an issue than there actually is.  When states and cities pass 
resolutions condemning genocide in Sudan and calling for more action, 
they may not have in mind the commitment of large amounts of U.S. 
troops or resources.  In this way, specific interest groups that are good at 
organizing on the local level around human rights issues could have a 
disproportionate effect on our foreign policy. 
In the end though, localities can provide an important forum to 
highlight foreign policy concerns of citizens and foster debate around 
these issues.  Localities can act as a refuge for dissent from national 
foreign policy and as a spark for change. 
Localities’ actions to influence foreign policy are often less 
nuanced than what would occur at the federal level.  This bluntness, 
however, can still serve valuable ends.  Localities may re-inject moral 
weight into foreign policy discussions through strong stands against 
slavery, genocide, apartheid, or sweatshop labor that often get lost in the 
realpolitik of the nation’s foreign policy bureaucracies.  Anger over local 
jobs leaving the United States to countries with lower wages and less 
regulation may result in “Buy America” laws.  These laws register a 
sense of disempowerment felt by citizens that federal agencies may not 
fully recognize when they negotiate new trade agreements that result in 
large movements of jobs and capital. 
5. Adoption of International or Foreign Law 
State and local governments also effect foreign relations by 
adopting, citing, or borrowing from international law.  In this way, they 
take on international commitments and enter a discourse with 
international institutions and other nations.  Such adoption of 
international law has so far been rare, but their existence shows a 
willingness of states and localities to take the lead in internalizing 
international norms at their own impetus.  Such adoption is also often in 
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protest of the U.S.’s unwillingness to adopt these norms for the country 
as a whole. 
The City of San Francisco passed an ordinance in 1998 to make the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) part of its local law.328  The city created a CEDAW taskforce 
to craft and monitor implementation of the Convention over a five year 
period.329 
In 2005, out of concern for how climate change will affect their 
cities and frustration over the lack of leadership from the federal 
government, a coalition of 132 mayors (representing nearly 29 million 
people) pledged to meet the emission reduction requirements Kyoto 
would have placed on them if the U.S. was a party.330  This is a non-
binding pledge, but has led to some city actions to reduce emissions.331 
In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court cited foreign law to contextualize its holding that a ban 
on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional.332  The use of international 
or foreign law is still rare outside citations to the Anglo-American 
common law, however. 
State and city governments will also share best practices with their 
international counterparts on issues ranging from counterterrorism, to 
human trafficking, and to good governance.333  In this way, components 
of many foreign laws are incorporated into U.S. law through emulation. 
V. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS TO INCREASE PARTICIPATORY 
DEMOCRACY 
There have been a number of proposals to foster greater 
participation in American democracy.334  Recently, James Fishkin and 
Bruce Ackerman have put forth a strong argument to create a 
 
 328. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12K (2001), available at 
http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/site/cosw_page.asp?id=10849. 
 329. Mark Sappenfield, In One US City, Life Under a UN Treaty on Women, CHRISTIAN.SCI. 
MON., Jan. 30, 2003, at 1. 
 330. Eli Sanders, Rebuffing Bush, 132 Mayors Embrace Kyoto Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 
2005, at 9A. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (citing Halpern v. 
Toronto (City), [2003] 172 O.A.C. 276 (Can.) and Eagle Canada, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), 
[2003] 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1 (Can.)). 
 333. Ilene Grossman, Roles Differ but Goals are Similar for State, Provincial Lawmakers, 
STATELINE, May 2005, http://www.csg.org/pubs/Documents/slmw-0505RolesDiffer.pdf. 
 334. For example, Benjamin Barber supports creating a system of neighborhood assemblies in 
which citizens could routinely question their elected representatives on their concerns. BENJAMIN 
BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 270 (1984). 
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deliberation day two weeks before major national elections.335  Citizens 
would be paid to attend and gather in groups of 15 to 500.  In these 
groups, they would discuss the major issues in the next election.  
Deliberative polling has shown that such civic engagement can have a 
large impact on citizens’ voting behavior.336  The implementation of an 
idea like deliberation day would also likely effect how voters voted on 
foreign policy issues.  After deliberative polling in Texas, voters were 
more likely to find that the current level of foreign aid was about right 
and that the U.S. should cooperate more with other countries militarily 
to address trouble spots in the world.337 
Indeed, if the goal is only to increase citizen discussion of foreign 
relations, a proposal like deliberation day would certainly engage more 
Americans than would result out of protecting localities’ role in foreign 
relations.  A proposal like deliberation day, however, does not address 
the other federalism benefits of having localities involved in foreign 
relations such as being laboratories for experimentation, a check on the 
power of the federal government, or the promotion of local autonomy. 
Instead, an idea like deliberation day is complimentary to localities’ 
involvement in foreign relations.  After discussing federal foreign policy 
in such a forum, members of a community may decide to work to take 
additional local-based action on a foreign policy issue.  For example, 
they may work to create a sister-city or sister-state relationship in a 
country the U.S. is aiding after a humanitarian disaster; institute 
CEDAW principles in their locality’s governance; or divest their 
community funds from a country that is committing egregious human 
rights abuses.  Further, the incidental foreign policy implications of 
many localities’ actions are more likely to be brought to the attention of 
voters during community discussion.  This may influence how voters 
look at issues and decisions that they once saw as purely domestic 
concerns. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts should recognize localities as concurrent actors with the 
federal government in U.S. foreign policy.  The judiciary should strike 
 
 335. Ackerman and Fishkin propose that the holiday actually be two days so as many people 
could participate as possible while businesses could still operate. Bruce Ackerman & James Fishkin, 
Righting the Ship of Democracy, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2004. 
 336. Id. 
 337. James Fishkin, Deliberative Polling: Toward a Better-Informed Democracy, CENTER FOR 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, available at http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/docs/summary/#exec (last 
visited Dec. 24, 2006). 
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down localities’ actions that affect foreign relations only when they are 
expressly preempted by the executive, Congress, or the Constitution.  To 
prosper in crafting foreign relations, however, localities need more than 
judicial recognition of their coexisting control over American foreign 
policy. 
First, the federal government must actively support localities’ role 
in foreign policy.  The federal government should better integrate 
localities into its foreign policy decision making.  For example, states 
are asked for some input by the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) on national trade policy, but they still do not play a lead role 
during trade negotiations.338  In contrast, in Canada provinces play a 
direct role in the creation of the nation’s trade policy.  In 2003, Ontario 
reportedly had more trade policy experts than all 50 states combined.339 
The federal government should also ensure that its foreign policy 
bureaucracy has interoperability at all levels of federalism.  The USTR, 
the State Department, the Treasury Department, and other divisions of 
the federal government can provide the information they gather and 
analyze not only to federal decision-makers, but also to state and local 
decision-makers.  In this way, the bureaucratic advantage that the federal 
government has in many foreign policy areas is shared as best as 
possible. 
Second, localities should also view themselves as foreign policy 
actors.  Localities can organize themselves more effectively to cope with 
governing in an internationally saturated environment.  For instance, 
some states have set up committees to study how trade policy is 
affecting them and to craft appropriate responses.340  Others have set up 
sub-cabinets to coordinate the state’s international relations.341 
Finally, citizens themselves must recognize that localities have 
 
 338. The United States Trade Representative receives state input when it negotiates 
international agreements from state and local officials that serve on its Intergovernmental Policy 
Advisory Committee on Trade.  Also state contact persons, usually the state chief economic or trade 
development officer, are given information and asked for input while the USTR is in negotiations. 
Jeremy Meadows, Consulting with States on Trade, STATE LEGISLATURES, Jul/Aug 2004, at 22. 
 339. WHATLEY, supra note 199, at 44. 
 340. In Texas, the Senate’s Committee on International Relations and Trade is charged with 
examining the North American Free Trade Agreement and the state’s economic relationship with 
Mexico.  The California Senate Select Committee on International Trade Policy and State 
Legislation studies the impacts of international trade agreements on state laws. Topics the 
committee considers are environmental protection, natural resource management, human rights 
protections, and public safety.  Maine passed a bill in 2004 that established a public commission to 
advise legislators regarding the economic impact of trade agreements on the state. Nick Steidel, 
States Study Trade Policy, STATE LEGISLATURES, Jul/Aug 2004, at 23. 
 341. WHATLEY, supra note 199, at 41. 
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become international actors.  Americans may or may not be global 
citizens, but they are certainly citizens with global worries.  Americans 
should view state and local governments as a place to express and act 
upon many (although certainly not all) of these concerns. 
Public recognition of the importance of localities’ involvement in 
foreign policy is critical to ensure that this space is not taken by the 
federal government.  Localities are far from perfect foreign policy 
actors, but American foreign policy is stronger with them engaged in 
international relations.  Further, without their engagement in foreign 
affairs, there is a real danger American democracy will increasingly 
become less accessible and participatory.  Courts can protect the 
available space left for localities in foreign relations, but it is ultimately 
Americans who will determine their continuing relevance.  As De 
Tocqueville warned in Democracy in America in a passage that still 
seems fitting today: 
[A] highly civilized community can hardly tolerate a local 
independence, is disgusted at its numerous blunders, and is apt to 
despair of success before the experiment is completed.  Again, the 
immunities of townships, which have been obtained with so much 
difficulty, are least of all protected against the encroachments of the 
supreme power.  They are unable to struggle, single-handed, against a 
strong and enterprising government, and they cannot defend 
themselves with success unless they are identified with the customs of 
the nation and supported by public opinion.342 
 
 
 342. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 62. 
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